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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Choosing an exchange rate regime remains an important economic policy issue for Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) (see von Hagen and Zhou 2005, Schnabl 2008, Frömmel and 
Schobert 2006, Belke and Kaas 2004, Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2006). Although exchange rate 
stability in CEE has been growing since the introduction of the euro in January 1999, 
different exchange rate strategies persist. While Lithuania, Latvia and Bulgaria are pegging 
their currencies tightly to the euro, the authorities in Romania, the Czech Republic and 
Poland allow their exchange rates to be largely determined by market forces. The central 
banks in Hungary have pursued managed floats. Estonia, the Slovak Republic as well as 
Slovenia have entered the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2011, 2009 and 2007.  
 
After the Eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU) and the subsequent increasing 
labor market integration of the EU15 and the new member states, wage determination in 
CEE has become a key issue in European economic policy making. Even if labor market 
integration between the old and the new member states of the EU has been increasing, large 
differences in wage levels persist (ECOFIN 2005, European Commission 2007, Eurostat 
2010, European Council 2010). Thus, labor unions in CEE tend to claim substantial wage 
increases to achieve a faster wage convergence towards the EU15. These claims have been 
accentuated by high labor migration to Western Europe that has led to a shortage of (highly-
qualified) workers (Goretti 2008) in CEE. 
 
The literature dealing with wage determination and exchange rates goes back to the Bretton-
Woods era. In the traditional theoretical frameworks of Friedman (1953), Meade (1951) and 
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Mundell (1961) exchange rate flexibility is seen as a substitute for wage rigidity in the face of 
exogenous shocks. In contrast, the theoretical model of Lindbeck (1979), which refers to the 
economic catch-up process of the Scandinavian countries under the Bretton-Woods system, 
suggests that fixed exchange rates provide a growth enhancing framework for the wage 
bargaining process.  
 
Up to now, relatively few papers have scrutinized wage determination in CEE under 
alternative exchange rate regimes. According to Mundell’s (1961) optimum currency area 
framework, a high degree of wage flexibility is required if exchange rates are irrevocably fixed 
but heterogeneity within the monetary union remains high. Based on this criterion, Belke and 
Kaas (2004), Gruber (2004), Iara and Traistaru (2004), Eichengreen and Ghironi (2002) and 
Paas et al. (2002), among others, have been analyzing wage flexibility in CEE.  
 
Belke and Setzer (2003) and Belke et al. (2004) consider the impact of exchange rate volatility 
on labor markets in CEE. They argue that exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro 
significantly raises unemployment. Schnabl (2008) studies the effect of exchange rate 
volatility on economic growth on the EMU periphery. He considers wage policy to be an 
important transmission channel for exchange rate stability leading to more growth, as fixed 
exchange rates provide more certainty for the wage bargaining process in small open 
economies.  
 
Building upon this foundation, this cumulative dissertation, which is a collection of four 
stand-alone essays, scrutinizes how the different exchange rate regimes in CEE influence the 
wage setting process.  
 
First, it is analyzed, which exchange rate strategy provides a more favorable framework for 
wage setting during the economic catch-up process of CEE (chapter two). This essay, co-
authored with Prof. Dr. Gunther Schnabl, builds on the Scandinavian model of wage 
adjustment by Lindbeck (1979) and analyzes, which exchange rate strategy contributes to 
faster wage convergence in Europe. Within a panel data approach this chapter reveals a 
positive relationship between exchange rates and wage growth suggesting that workers in 
countries with fixed exchange rates are likely to benefit from higher wage increases. 
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Second, chapter three studies the role of monetary policy with respect to exchange rate 
system for the wage setting process. Monetary policy in CEE is an important determinant in 
the wage bargaining process, because trade unions have to predict inflation as one component of 
future real wages. It is scrutinized whether countries in CEE that officially announce an 
inflation target are tempted to act time-inconsistently and switch from the announced 
inflation target to an exchange rate target in order to sustain higher output via surprise 
inflation. If market participants discover the time-inconsistency, they will adjust their inflation 
expectations, which result in higher average rates of price increases. The time-inconsistent 
behavior in central bank interest rate setting is modeled by several Taylor rules. An empirical 
application provides evidence that some monetary authorities in CEE such as the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia have acted time-inconsistent and have focused on the exchange rate in 
periods of official inflation targeting, which might have contributed to higher average rates of 
inflation and welfare losses. Furthermore, uncertainty in wage determination process has 
risen due to a harder predictability of productivity and inflation as components of future 
nominal wages.  
 
In addition, precise predictions of future economic growth and revenues are pivotal 
determinants of the wage bargaining process. Therefore, chapter four analyzes the predictive 
power of several European early business cycle indicators at forecasting output growth. 
Reliable business cycle indicators for the euro area help enterprises and trade unions in CEE 
economies, which have relatively large export sectors with a high share of exports to the euro 
area, to predict future exports and revenues. The higher the uncertainty about future exports, the 
higher will be the uncertainty in the wage determination process. CEE economies, which fix the 
exchange rate tightly to the euro and which cannot offset a negative (positive) productivity shock 
by currency depreciation (appreciation), are particularly interested in reliable projections for the 
euro zone, especially at forecasting turning points (booms and recessions). The forecast 
comparison is conducted in a bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) framework. The 
indicators are compared by means of an in-sample and an out-of-sample forecasting 
experiment. Their predictive accuracy is compared by recently proposed tests for superior 
predictive ability. The results suggest that nearly all indicators have good in-sample properties 
and that a majority of them is able to outperform a naive univariate autoregressive model 
out-of-sample. Additionally, it is found that indicators perform better in boom-periods than 
in periods of economic losses. 
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Furthermore, the thesis contributes to the current debate on current account imbalances 
within in the EU (see Belke and Dreger 2011, Zemanek et al. 2010), while it analyzes the 
impact of wage determination and the exchange rate policy on current account balance of 
CEE economies. Thus, chapter five analyzes the impact of wage growth exceeding 
productivity growth on the current account balances in CEE: If capital inflows, e.g. in the 
form of bank credits or foreign direct investments (FDI), lead to growing wages in excess of 
productivity growth, the respective (wage-based) real exchange rate appreciation deteriorates 
the current account balance. To model the relation between wages and productivity in CEE 
and to derive the real wage-based exchange rate, the model traditional Lindbeck (1979) is 
extended. The results of panel estimations reveal a robust negative (positive) relationship 
between real wage-based exchange rates appreciation (depreciation) and the current account. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Exchange Rate Regime and Wage 
Determination in Central and Eastern Europe1  
 
Co-authored with Prof. Dr. Gunther Schnabl. Published as CESifo Working Paper, 2471, 2008 and as a 
revision in the Journal of Policy Modeling, 2011,!3, 347-360.2 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Choosing the appropriate exchange rate regime remains an important and controversial 
economic policy issue for the Central and Eastern European countries (Belke and Kaas 2004, 
von Hagen and Zhou 2005, Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2006, Frömmel and Schobert 2006, 
Schnabl 2008). Although exchange rate stability in CEE has grown since the introduction of 
the euro different exchange rate strategies persist. While Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic are pegging their currencies tightly to the euro or have 
joined the euro area, the Czech Republic, Poland and most recently Hungary allow their 
exchange rates to be widely determined by market forces. The central bank of Romania 
manages the exchange rate discretionarily. Also in the face of the recent crisis, countries have 
chosen to either keep exchange rates stable or to allow for adjustment via depreciation.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1   This chapter was a joint idea. I provided the first draft of this chapter, which included the extension of the 
theoretical model and the empirical application. Gunther Schnabl revised the chapter and contributed parts of 
the theoretical model. 
2  This paper was presented at the workshop ''Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen'' in Göttingen, the SMYE 
conference in Istanbul, at a seminar of the Polish national bank and a Ph.D. seminar in Leipzig. 
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At the same time wage determination in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has become a 
key issue in European economic policy making, as large differences in wage levels persist 
(ECOFIN 2005, European Commission 2007). For instance, labor unions in CEE have 
tended to claim substantial wage increases to achieve a faster wage convergence to the EU15 
(see for instance the Skoda wage bargaining process in the Czech Republic 2007). These 
claims have been accentuated by the fact that rising production, increasing productivity and 
labor migration to Western Europe have led to a shortage of (highly-qualified) workers 
(Goretti 2008). Nonetheless, institutional factors such as different tax systems, wage rigidities, 
a low degree of unionization and collective bargaining have contributed to the persistence of 
wage gaps (EIRO 2008). 
 
Although both, the choice of exchange rate regime and the wage determination process in 
Central and Eastern Europe have been subject to extensive academic discussions, until now 
comparatively few papers have scrutinized the interaction of both, i.e. the role of exchange 
rates for wage setting in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Mundell's (1961) seminal 
theory of optimum currency areas, a high degree of wage flexibility is required if exchange 
rates are irrevocably fixed and heterogeneity within the monetary union remains high. Based 
on Mundell's OCA criterion, Bertola (2008), Paas et al. (2002), Belke and Kaas (2004), 
Gruber (2004), Iara and Traistaru (2004) and Babestskii (2007) among others, have analyzed 
the degree of wage flexibility in CEE. 
 
Belke and Setzer (2003) and Belke et al. (2004) are considering the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on labor markets in CEE. They argue that exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the euro 
significantly contributes to higher unemployment. Schnabl (2008) studies the effect of 
exchange rate volatility on economic growth in the EMU periphery. He argues that exchange 
rate stability provides more certainty for the wage bargaining process in small open 
economies and thereby leads to higher growth and wages.  
 
We will build upon this discussion by examining which exchange rate strategy provides a 
more favorable framework for the wage setting process in emerging markets leading to faster 
wage growth in CEE. The investigation will be based on the seminal Lindbeck model of 
wage convergence during the economic catch-up, which will be tested empirically. 
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2.2. Theoretical Framework of Exchange Rate Regimes and 
Wage Determination 
 
The literature dealing with wage determination and exchange rates goes back to the Bretton 
Woods era. Friedman (1953), Meade (1951) and Mundell (1961) saw exchange rate flexibility 
as a substitute for wage rigidity in the face of asymmetric shocks.  Given flexible exchange 
rates and rigid wages in small open economies (as they prevail in CEE), a negative (positive) 
productivity shock is offset by currency depreciation (appreciation). Monetary expansion and 
depreciation are seen as Keynesian tools to address deflationary shocks and sustain growth 
and welfare.  
 
In contrast, in the Scandinavian model of wage adjustment (Lindbeck 1979) fixed exchange 
rates provide growth enhancing framework for wage determination in small open economies 
during the economic catch-up process. In this dynamic extension of the Balassa-Samuelson 
model (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964), fixed exchange rates lead to more certainty as 
enterprises and trade unions can rely on a more stable macroeconomic environment for the 
wage bargaining process. The outcome is higher wages than under flexible exchange rate 
regimes. From this point of view implicitly a higher wage level can be achieved, because 
exchange rate stability contributes to more flexible institutions and thereby higher growth and 
welfare. This is different to views that link exchange rate stability to more flexible institutions, 
which reduce the bargaining power of workers and therefore lead to a lower reservation wage 
(see for instance Bertola 2008). 
 
In this paper we apply Lindbeck´s (1979) approach to CEE. The Scandinavian model, which 
goes back to a group of Norwegian (see Aukrust, Holte and Stoltz 1967) and Swedish 
economists (Edgren, Gösta, Faxén and Odhner 1970) and was summarized by Lindbeck 
(1979)3 was designed to explain the wage adjustment of the Scandinavian countries in the 
economic catch-up versus the US. Under the Bretton Woods System of fixed dollar parities, 
during the 1950s and 60s, Sweden along with Norway and Denmark were among Western 
Europe’s fastest growing economies. In contrast to the CEE countries today, where different 
exchange rate strategies coexist, all Scandinavian countries fixed their currencies to the dollar. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For an empirical analysis of the Lindbeck model for the  Scandinavian countries see Forslund et al. (2006). 
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The Scandinavian model of wage adjustment had the basic idea that nominal wage growth 
was driven by productivity increases and inflation. Domestic inflation was expressed in terms 
of world inflation and exchange rate developments. 
 
One basic assumption of the Lindbeck model is that purchasing power parity holds: Given 
perfect arbitrage, domestic price inflation in the tradable good sector 
! 
" pT
d  is assumed to be 
equal to inflation on world traded good markets 
! 
" pT
W
, (measured in terms of the dominant 
international money) plus the rate of currency appreciation/depreciation
! 
" e
! 
" pT
d = " pT
W + "e( ).4 The Scandinavian authors in the 1960s did not consider exchange rates 
to be important policy variables since the Scandinavian exchange rates were tightly fixed to 
the dollar and exchange rate changes were (close to) zero. They assumed that arbitrage in 
international traded goods markets ensured inflation in the domestic traded goods sector to 
converge to inflation in the dollar denominated world traded goods markets.5 
 
Lindbeck (1979) further assumed that the wage bargaining process was initiated in the 
(industrial) tradable goods sector, where labor productivity tends to grow faster than in the 
non-tradable (service) sector.6 As workers are aware of increasing productivity, they bargain 
fiercely for respective wage increases. Let 
! 
"qT
d  be the productivity growth in the tradable 
sector, reflecting increasing stocks of human and physical capital. The trade unions in the 
''unsheltered'' tradable sector are assumed to orient their wage bargaining on productivity 
gains plus eventual price increases of tradable goods world market prices
! 
" pT
d . Therefore, the 
average rate of the nominal wage increases in the tradable sector 
! 
"w
T
d
 is characterized by the 
sum of tradable goods inflation and productivity increases: 
 
! 
"wT
d
= " pT
d
+ "qT
d                                                                                                               (1) 
 
According to Lindbeck in small open economies (such as in CEE) the wage bargaining 
process can be regarded as being constrained by fixed exchange rates. If trade unions bargain 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 While Lindbeck assumed the dollar to be the dominant international money, we assume that the euro is the 
dominant reference currency for CEE as most international goods and financial flows in CEE are denominated 
in euros (ECB 2008). 
5 This implies that exports are priced in foreign currency, which was a realistic assumption for the Scandinavian 
countries and which is a realistic assumption today for the CEE (McKinnon 2005). 
6   In contrast, Goretti (2008) argues that the wage bargaining process may start in the (non-traded goods) public 
sector and is transmitted to the other sectors of the economy. 
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for nominal wage increases beyond equation (1) (and enterprises shift these wage increases to 
international prices to keep profit margins constant) manufacturing goods become 
uncompetitive in world markets with a fall in employment. 7  
 
While wage increases beyond equation (1) may be possible in the short-run, in the long-run 
trade unions would return to equation (1) to avoid rising structural unemployment.8 Thus, 
equation (1) defines the natural (long-run) rate of nominal wage increases in a small open 
economy. As long as inflation in world prices 
! 
pT
W  remains low and fairly predictable, workers 
are content to bargain for the concurrent trends in domestic productivity growth and world 
inflation. 
 
As in the Balassa-Samuelson framework, Lindbeck (1979) assumed that labor ''solidarity'' and 
labor mobility between the manufacturing sector and the non-tradable sectors transmit the 
manufacturing wage increases to wage increases in the service sector
! 
w
NT
d  (
! 
"w
T
d
= "w
NT
d ). As 
the non-tradable sectors were widely shielded from world markets, prices in these sectors 
were assumed not to be driven by international competition but would be based on domestic 
labor costs. The price increases in the non-tradable sector 
! 
" pNT
d are equivalent to wage 
increases
! 
"w
NT
d  minus the productivity gains in the non-traded goods sector
! 
"qNT
d , where 
productivity increases in the non-tradable (service) sector were assumed to be smaller than in 
the traded goods sector 
! 
" pNT
d = "wNT
d
#"qNT
d( )  with 
! 
"qNT
d < "qT
d( ) .                  
 
Thus, in the Scandinavian model, the wage bargaining and price adjustment processes in the 
traded and non-traded goods sectors affect general inflation 
! 
"p
d  which is defined as a 
composite of traded goods inflation and non-traded goods inflation given the respective 
weights 
! 
"and (
! 
1"# ) in the consumer basket and can be can be interpreted as an overall 
measure for supply-driven inflation in a small open economy in the economic catch-up 
process: 
 
! 
" p
d
=#" pT
d
+ (1$#)" pNT
d
= (" pT
W
+ "e) + (1$#)("qT
d
$"qNT
d
)
            (2) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7   It is argued for instance, that prior to the 2008/09 crisis the real wage increases in the Baltics and Hungary have 
gone beyond productivity increases. 
8    Alternatively, rising unemployment reduces the bargaining power of trade unions. 
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In equation (2) the term 
! 
(" pT
W
+ "e) is equivalent to imported inflation. If world market 
prices in the traded goods sector rise (fall) and/or if the exchange rate depreciates 
(appreciates), this would fuel domestic inflation (deflation). The term 
! 
(1"#)($qT
d
"$qNT
d
)
captures the structural component of inflation, which is in line with the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect of supply driven inflation (Balassa 1964 and Samuelson 1964).9 Relative productivity 
gains in the tradable goods sector 
! 
("qT
d
#"qNT
d
> 0)  are translated via the wage bargaining 
process into higher inflation. The greater the weight of the non-tradable goods sector in the 
economy
! 
(1"#) , or the larger the difference between productivity growth of the tradable and 
the non-tradable goods sector, the larger the impact on domestic inflation. 
 
2.3. Wage Adjustment in Labor Markets under Alternative 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Whereas the Lindbeck model was originally constructed for the Scandinavian countries which 
pegged their currencies to the dollar, today the CEE countries can choose their exchange rate 
strategies (see Table 1): The Baltics have chosen a hard peg to the euro within the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism II and aim to adopt the euro as a legal tender as soon as possible. In 
contrast, the monetary authorities of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have 
implemented inflation targeting frameworks and let their exchange rates float (more or less) 
freely. They have continued – up to the recent crisis, which made the benefits of EMU 
membership more evident – to postpone the euro adoption targets. 
 
Figure 1 shows the de facto quarterly exchange rate changes of the CEE countries currencies 
against the euro (before 1999 the DM). There are two clusters. The first group of countries, 
namely Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland allowed their exchange rate to 
float to a high degree, while the second group, the Baltic countries and Slovenia, exhibit low 
exchange rate volatility against the euro. The Estonian currency board is pegging the kroon 
tightly to the euro (or DM) in the whole observation period.  Lithuania and Latvia pegged 
their currencies to the dollar and a currency basket before pegging to the euro.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
     Schnabl (2008) discusses the possible shortcomings of the Balassa-Samuelson approach. 
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With the introduction of the euro in January 2009, Slovakia shifted from a widely flexible to a 
“tightly fixed” exchange rate. Choosing alternative exchange rate strategies will have different 
implications for the wage setting process in the economic catch-up. Following De Grauwe 
and Schnabl (2005), we show that the industrial catch-up of emerging markets under 
alternative exchange rate strategies leads to two alternative outcomes depending on the 
monetary framework:  
 
First, if exchange rates are pegged, the relative productivity gains drive up prices as in the 
seminal Balassa-Samuelson model. Relative productivity gains are translated via the wage 
bargaining process into higher prices for non-traded goods and therefore into rising overall 
prices. 
 
Second, if exchange rates are freely floating and the central banks follow an inflation target, 
relative productivity gains are accompanied by nominal appreciation. Even if both monetary 
frameworks can be seen as equal policy choices to engineer the real appreciation, which is the 
natural outcome of industrial catch-up process, exchange rate volatility and the nominal 
appreciation path may increase uncertainty in labor markets. 
 
Based on the Scandinavian model we derive the implications for the wage determination 
process in emerging markets under alternative exchange rate regimes. Based on equation (2) 
we define the overall domestic wage growth (
! 
"w
d ) as the sum of overall productivity growth 
(
! 
"q
d ) and inflation (
! 
" p
d ) (
! 
"w
d
= " p
d
+ "q
d ).  Overall productivity growth is assumed to be 
a composite of traded goods and non-traded goods productivity growth given the respective 
weights
! 
"and 
! 
(1" #)(
! 
"qd = #"qT
d
+ (1$ #)"qNT
d ).      
 
Thus, the overall long-run supply driven nominal wage growth in Central and Eastern 
Europe is defined as: 
  
                         (3) 
 
where 
! 
" = # $% +1( ) is a positive constant term. According to equation (3) nominal wage 
growth is driven by productivity gains of the tradable goods sector relative to the non-
tradable goods sector as well as by imported inflation in the traded goods sector 
! 
"pT
W  and 
! 
"w
d
= #("qT
d
$"qNT
d
) + (" pT
W
+ "e),
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exchange rate changes 
! 
"e( ) . Assuming price notations of the Central and Eastern European 
currencies, a positive (negative) 
! 
"e is equivalent to depreciation (appreciation). 
 
Figure 1: Exchange rate changes against the euro, quarter-over-quarter 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2008. Before 1999 the German Mark represents the euro. 
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2.1 Reference Series
Our reference series is given by the year-over-year (yoy) growth rate of industrial pro-
duction index for the Euro Area (source: Datastream), which is available at a monthly
frequency. Alternatively, we may have used the quarterly recorded GDP but this would
imply a much smaller sample size. It is a well known fact that estimators perform better
and inference gets more reliable as the sample size increases. Therefore, we employ the
industrial production series as reference. Although this production-index counts only one
third of the total GDP most impulses leading the business cycle are caused by the industrial
sector (see Breitung and Jagodzinski (2001)). In addition, we choose to have a balanced
sample size across indicators, implying that the data spans from 1991M02 to 2007M07.
3
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Table 1: Exchange rate strategies in CEE in 2008 
 
Country Current exchange rate system Euro adoption 
CZ Free floating with inflation target 
since 1997, from 1995 till 1997 
managed float 
The preliminary target date (1st January 
2010) was withdrawn by the government on 
25 October 2006. No new date has been 
officially set for the time being. 
EE Currency board with a hard peg to 
the euro within the ERM II (since 
June 2004) 
January 2011 
HU Free floating since March 2008, 
before managed floats, with 
inflation target since 2002 
The Convergence Programme of 1st  
December 2006 aimed at meeting the 
Maastricht criteria in 2009. A new target 
date for the adoption of the euro has not 
been specified. 
LT Currency board with a hard peg to 
the euro within the ERM II (since 
June 2004), before hard dollar peg 
The specific target date has not been set. 
According to the government, LT aims to 
join the euro area as soon as possible.  
LV De facto currency board with a hard 
peg to the euro within the ERM II 
(since May 2005), before currency 
basket 
The specific target date has not been set. 
PL Free floating with inflation target 
since 2000, from 1995 till 2000 
managed float 
The specific target date has not been set. 
SK ERM II membership (exchange rate 
with 15 percent fluctuation band) 
from November 2005 to December 
2008, before managed floats 
January 2009 
SI EMU membership since January 
2007, before ERM II membership 
(exchange rate with 15 percent 
fluctuation band) since June 2004 
January 2007 
Source: ECB (2008) and European Commission (2007). 
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The wage setting process can occur within two institutional environments. In countries 
pegging their exchange rates tightly to the euro, for instance Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, the 
term 
! 
"e  is equal (or close) to zero. This reduces the uncertainty for the wage bargaining 
process, because trade unions and enterprises have solely to predict future productivity gains 
and traded goods inflation. In the Lindbeck model it is assumed that the biddings of trade 
unions for higher wages are constrained by the fixed exchange rate. Trade unions reap the 
full benefits of productivity gains and equilibrate the international competitiveness between 
Central and Eastern Europe and the euro area. But trade unions would not want to ask for 
wage increases above domestic productivity gains as this would erode the enterprises’ 
international competitiveness.  
 
In countries with freely floating exchange rates such as Poland or the Czech Republic an 
additional factor of uncertainty is introduced into the wage bargaining process as exchange 
rate volatility is high. To project future profits the enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe 
have to know at which level the future exchange rate will be. If the exchange rate is regarded 
as an asset price, which follows a random walk, there is uncertainty because the exchange rate 
may appreciate or depreciate which implies higher transactions costs for the wage bargaining 
process. If – due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect – firms expect an appreciation of the 
domestic currency, they are reluctant to commit to wage increases as export revenues may 
decline. Workers would have to negotiate harder for wage increases and the costs of wage 
bargaining would increase.10 To model increasing transaction cost for the wage bargaining 
process arising from exchange rate volatility we include a risk premium 
! 
"  in equation (4) with 
the constant p constituting the elasticity from exchange rate volatility to nominal wage 
growth. This implies:  
 
! 
"wd = #("qT
d $"qNT
d
) + (" pT
W
+ "e) + p%                (4) 
 
While in countries with an exchange rate peg 
! 
"  and 
! 
"e are assumed to be (close to) zero, the 
exchange rate uncertainty in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes implies in 
Lindbecks framework a negative risk premium on wages (
! 
" < 0).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10  For instance, comparing the two corner solutions in the choice of exchange rate regime Estonia and Poland, 
Poland exhibits a substantially larger number of lost working days due to strikes and lock outs.  
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It is assumed that enterprises shift these costs to workers to keep profit margins constant. 
For instance, additional costs arise due to more frictions in the wage bargaining process. 
Lower (higher) wage increases originating in exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) caused 
by the Balassa-Samuelson effect is expected to be captured by the exchange rate term !e.  
 
Microeconomic models of the wage bargaining process such as Bertola (2008) assume a 
positive risk premium as under flexible exchange rates the bargaining power of workers and 
therefore the reservation wage increases. We leave it to the econometric part of the paper to 
single out the sign of the risk premium. 
 
2.4. Estimation Framework 
 
We use equation (4) as a framework to test empirically for the validity of the Lindbeck (1979) 
hypothesis that relative productivity changes, world market inflation, exchange rate changes 
and exchange rate risk on wages have an impact on nominal wage determination in Central 
and Eastern Europe. We investigate whether there is evidence for the CEE countries from an 
inter-temporal and cross-section perspective. We include eight CEE countries in our panel, 
which entered the European Union in May 2004, namely Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), 
Hungary (HU), Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Slovak Republic (SK), and Slovenia 
(SI). Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the European Union in January 2007, are omitted 
due to missing (wage) data. 
 
2.4.1 Data 
 
Our sample starts in the first quarter of 1995 and ends with the last quarter of 2007.11 Before 
1996 data on the former transition economies is very fragmented.  We use quarterly data, 
which is the smallest available frequency for all considered time series.12 Nominal gross wages
! 
(w
d
) are from national central bank statistics taken from the Reuters Ecowin database.13 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11  Note that the PPI for most CEE countries is only available from 1998Q1. Due to balancing the panel the 
estimation period ranges from 1996 Q1 till 2006Q4 with the GDP per capita proxy and from 1999Q1 till 
2006Q4 with the PPI/CPI proxy. 
12   To adjust data seasonally, we calculate year-over-year growth rates instead of quarter-over-quarter growth rates. 
13   Net wages are not available for most countries on a quarterly basis. 
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Exchange rates 
! 
("e)  (quarterly averages), inflation and productivity measures are drawn from 
Eurostat and IMF International Financial Statistics. Euro area tradable goods prices 
! 
pT
W  are 
proxied by German export prices as export prices for the euro area are not available, and 
Germany is the largest country in the euro area.14  
 
As a proxy for productivity term 
! 
("qT
d
#"qNT
d
)  we use nominal GDP per capita growth, 
because industrial and service sector production per employee are not available for the whole 
time period for every country at quarterly frequencies. As alternative productivity differential 
measure we use the ratio of consumer (CPI) to producer prices (PPI) analogous to De 
Grauwe and Schnabl (2005). Following Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), this measure 
regards relative price increases of non-traded goods versus traded goods as a proxy for 
relative productivity gains.  
 
The quarterly averages of exchange rates are in price notation, which implies that a negative 
exchange rate change indicates an appreciation of the national currency against the euro. As 
proxies for the risk premium 
! 
(") arising from exchange rate uncertainty we use several 
measures to ensure the robustness of our results.  
 
First and second, the squared and absolute quarterly exchange rate changes 
! 
"e . Third, we 
consider intra-quarter realized volatilities based on daily exchange rate changes which 
aggregate information from higher frequencies to obtain more accurate measure of 
unobserved intra-period volatility (for the compilation see Andersen et al. 2003). Forth, we 
use the standard deviations of daily exchange rate changes as well as (fifth) the z-score as 
proposed by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) which links daily exchange rate changes and its 
standard deviation.15 The sixth volatility measure is an estimated GARCH (1,1) volatility 
series (see Bollerslev 1986). 
 
With the exception of the proxies for the risk premium proxies all time series are year-over-
year quarterly growth rates. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14   As alternative inflation measures, the harmonized consumer price index as well as the producer price index of the 
euro area (EU-12) have been used as robustness check. Both proxies lead to similar results which are available 
upon request. 
15
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2.4.2. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Equation (4) implies that controlling for exchange rate changes, world traded goods inflation 
and relative productivity changes, countries with fixed exchange rates have a higher real wage 
growth. Note that domestic traded goods inflation has been substituted by euro area traded 
goods inflation and exchange rate changes to model the international dimension of price and 
wage determination in small open economies.  
 
The descriptive statistics focus on real wage growth. In contrast to the regressions in the next 
section, the descriptive statistics do not control for other determinants as in our extended 
Balassa-Samuelson specification.   
 
Figure 2 displays the real wage growth of the CEE countries since 1996. We observe that real 
wage growth tends to be higher in the Baltics than in countries with flexible exchange rates. 
Comparing the two corner solutions, Poland (free float) and Estonia (hard peg), real wage 
growth in Estonia has been significantly higher than in Poland.   
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of real wage growth in the individual countries. In 
general, they support the conclusions drawn from the Lindbeck model. The mean and 
median of real wage growth in countries with fixed exchange rates are higher than wage 
growth in countries with free floats; e.g. Latvia has a real wage growth of 4.4 percent per year 
on average, while the real wage growth of Poland is on average 2.3 percent. Estonia has with 
an average real wage growth of 6.3 percent the greatest wage growth, while the Slovak 
Republic with a real wage growth of 2.1 percent has the smallest.   
 
A t-test (t1) which analyzes whether the individual means differ from the group mean, 
indicates that all means are different from the pooled mean. The average real wage growth of 
countries with a fixed exchange rate peg is significantly higher wage growth than the group 
mean, while in countries with flexible exchange rates – with the exception of Czech Republic 
– the average wage growth is below the pooled wage growth of 3.8 percent.16  The F-test 
provides information with respect to equality of all means. The null hypothesis of equal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16
    An alternative t-test (t2) shows that the individual means are significantly different from zero. 
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means is rejected for all countries, which imply that the average real wage growth differs 
between all new member states.  
 
Figure 2: Real wage growth, year-over-year 
 
 
Source: National statistics, 2008 (drawn from Reuters Ecowin). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, real wage growth (y-o-y, quarterly data) 
 
Country Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. Obs. t1 t2 
CZ 0.040 0.038 0.080 -0.004 0.019 44 
12.243 
(0.000) 
5.430 
(0.000) 
EE 0.063 0.066 0.118 -0.015 0.026 44 
15.317 
(0.000) 
10.203 
(0.000) 
HU 0.033 0.034 0.109 -0.070 0.037 44 
-11.247 
(0.000) 
-13.788 
(0.000) 
LV 0.045 0.037 0.147 -0.087 0.048 44 
6.678 
(0.000) 
4.097 
(0.000) 
LT 0.044 0.045 0.184 -0.185 0.083 44 
6.518 
(0.000) 
4.185 
(0.000) 
PL 0.023 0.024 0.063 -0.019 0.020 44 
5.217 
(0.000) 
2.739 
(0.000) 
SK 0.021 0.034 0.091 -0.088 0.042 44 
3.885 
(0.000) 
3.122 
(0.000) 
SI 0.034 0.037 0.087 -0.0085 0.018 44 
-3.548 
(0.001) 
-9.343 
(0.000) 
All 0.038 0.031 0.184 -0.185 0.043 352   
F 63.971 (0.000)       
Notes: t2 is the t-statistic for the hypothesis that the mean is zero. t1 is the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the 
individual mean does not significantly differ from the overall group mean. F is an F-statistic for the hypothesis that 
all means are equal. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
The Fisher-ADF panel unit root test (Choi 2001, Madalla and Wu 1999) is based on 
individual p-values for the unit root hypothesis, which are combined in a second step to 
obtain an overall p-value. It does not find evidence for unit roots in the investigated panel 
(Table 3). Henceforth, neither panel cointegration nor spurious regressions are a matter of 
concern. Motivated by these findings, we examine if there is a positive systematic relationship 
between exchange rate stability and wage growth in CEE. 
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Table 3: Panel Unit Root Test 
 
   Fisher -Statistics 
Probability 
value 
Wage growth 24.641 0.077 
Exchange rate growth 57.485 0.000 
German Export growth 43.911 0.000 
GDP per capita growth 50.194 0.000 
CPI/PPI growth 34.342 0.005 
Squared returns 59.238 0.000 
Absolute returns 61.555 0.000 
Realized volatility 68.679 0.000 
Standard deviation 87.086 0.000 
Z-score 67.672 0.000 
GARCH 75.102 0.000 
 
Notes: The lag length is chosen with the information criterion proposed by Akaike (1976).  
The Fisher ADF test has the Null hypothesis of an unit root.  
 
 
2.4.3. Estimation framework 
 
We estimate the Lindbeck model as in equation (4) for a CEE cross-country panel to identify 
the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on nominal wage growth. To specify the model 
properties we test for each specification random effects against fixed effects with the help of 
the Hausman-Test (Hausman 1978). For all specifications the Hausman test computes a p-
value of more than 0.05 in favor of a random effects specification (see Table 4 and 5). 
Based on equation (4) we estimate the following model: 
          
! 
"wit
d = µ + #("qit,T
d $"qit,NT
d
) + %" pt,T
W + &"eit + '( it + uit   with 
! 
u
it
= µ
i
+ v
it
,        (5)     
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where  i=1,..,8 denotes the cross-section and t=1996Q1,…,2006Q4 the time dimension.17 The 
term 
! 
µ  denotes the overall constant, while 
! 
µ
i
 denotes the country-specific deviations from
! 
µ . 
The random effects specification assumes that the country-specific effects are realizations of 
independent random variables with mean zero and finite variance. Most importantly, the 
random effect specification assumes that the individual country specific effect is uncorrelated 
with the idiosyncratic residual 
! 
v
it
.  
 
The estimation of the covariance matrix for the composite error uses the quadratic unbiased 
estimators from Swamy-Arora (1972) for small sample sizes.18 Furthermore, we test for 
possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals with the help of the Breusch-
Pagan (1980) and Breusch-Godfrey (1981) tests. The respective p-values show that we face 
cross-sectional heteroscedasticity as well as serial correlation (Table 4 and 5) in our residuals.   
 
Furthermore, the estimates can be subject to endogeneity bias, in particular with respect to 
the productivity measures.19 In contrast, we treat prices on world traded goods markets as 
well as exchange rate regimes as exogenous. Domestic wages policies do not affect world 
markets prices and wage policies are usually not a criterion for the choice of exchange rate 
regime. 
 
For the estimates, we use a two-stage least squares estimator (White 1980, Arellano 1987), 
which copes for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms. Eight lags of the 
endogenous variable as well as the exogenous variables are used as instruments.20 The Null 
hypothesis of validity of instruments with Sargan-Test (Sargan 1958) cannot be rejected for 
all specifications.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17   To control for a small country bias we estimate as a robustness test a model including the degree of openness as 
an explanatory variable. In addition to control for possible dynamics in the model, simulating a staggered wage 
setting process, we add an AR(1) term of the dependent variable. Both models yield similar results, which are 
available upon request. The constant term 
! 
"  is included in the constant term
! 
" .  
18
  The estimation of the covariance matrix with the Wallace-Hussain (1969) estimator, who is not explicitly 
constructed for small sample sizes, does not change our results. 
19   The Hausman LM-Test on exogeneity confirms this hypothesis.  
20   We tested different sets of instruments by excluding/adding lags of the explanatory variables. The results remain  
      widely unchanged. 
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2.4.4. Results 
 
The estimation results for the IV panel estimation are reported in Table 4, where following 
equation (5) the nominal wage growth 
! 
("w
it
d
) is regressed on the constant term 
! 
(µ ), GDP 
per capita growth as productivity measure 
! 
("qit,T
d
#"qit,NT
d
) , German export price inflation as 
proxy for international traded goods prices 
! 
(" pt ,T
W
) , exchange rate changes in price notation 
! 
("e
it
) and the different risk premium measures as described in the data section 
! 
("
it
) .  
 
In the regression (Table 4, column 1) with squared exchange rate changes as uncertainty 
measure all estimated parameters have the expected sign. The productivity measure and the 
exchange rate term are significant at the common levels. All signs of the estimates are 
congruent with the Lindbeck model. Increasing productivity (positive 
! 
"  term) is linked to 
increasing wages at the common significance levels. Changes in German export prices (as 
proxy for euro area traded goods inflation) (
! 
" term) are smaller than unity and have no 
significant impact on nominal wage growth.21 The 
! 
"  coefficient, which captures the impact of 
exchange rate changes on wages, is smaller than one and has the expected positive sign at the 
1 % significance level. 
 
If home currency is appreciating (depreciating) against the euro (
! 
"e<0 (
! 
"e>0)) nominal 
wages decline (increase). This implies that the exchange rate regime has a significant impact 
on wage determination in the eight analyzed CEE countries. Among productivity growth, 
euro area tradable goods inflation and exchange rate changes, exchange rate changes have the 
highest impact on nominal wage growth as indicated by the largest coefficient. Note, 
however, that the " and # coefficients are far from unity as suggested by equation (4).22 A ten 
percent exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) is linked to roughly four percent wage 
growth (decline).  
 
Table 4 reports our baseline regression with different exchange rate uncertainty measures as 
explained above. Estimating equation (5) with different exchange rate risk measures does not 
change the main findings. All parameters originating in the Lindbeck model remain widely 
unchanged. Productivity growth is linked to nominal wage growth, while tradable goods 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21    In a shorter sample which starts in 1999 the -terms turns positive and significant.  
22    This finding applies to all specifications.  
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inflation in the euro area has no significant impact on wages with a coefficient significantly 
smaller than unity. Currency appreciation (depreciation) against the euro lowers (increases) 
nominal wage growth, but the effect is less than proportionally. The size of the coefficients 
! 
", #  and
! 
"  remains widely the same. The results for different measures of exchange rate 
uncertainty differ within the regressions. Absolute returns, realized volatility and the GARCH 
variance proxies for exchange rate uncertainty have in line with Lindbecks model a negative 
sign but only absolute returns and the GARCH variance are statistically significant at the 
common levels. In contrast, the
! 
"  coefficient is positive for standard deviations against the 
euro and the z-scores, but remains insignificant in both cases.  
 
All in all, the evidence for a significant effect of the exchange rate on wages is strong as all 
exchange rate terms and four out of six risk premium-terms have the expected sign, mostly at 
significant levels. The evidence in favor of the Lindbeck model is mixed. 
 
In addition we use relative consumer versus producer prices as an alternative productivity 
measure for the term 
! 
("qit,T
d
#"qit,NT
d
) . Table 5 displays the estimation results. Again higher 
productivity growth is linked to higher wage growth.  Euro area tradable goods inflation has, 
in contrast to the previous estimation, a positive and significant influence on wage growth. A 
currency appreciation (depreciation) lowers (increases) wage growth (positive
! 
" coefficient). 
The impact of exchange rate changes on wages is however smaller than in the baseline 
regressions. A currency appreciation (depreciation) of around ten percent is transmitted via 
the wage bargaining process into three percent lower (higher) wages.  
 
The results are very robust throughout the set of different exchange rate uncertainty 
measures. Euro area tradable goods inflation has the highest impact on nominal wages 
followed by productivity growth and exchange rate changes.   
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Table 4: IV- Panel estimation results of nominal wage growth, 1996Q1 till 2006Q4  
 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Hausman (H0: random effects), Breusch-
Pagan (H0: homoskedastic residuals), Breusch-Godfrey (H0: no serial correlation) and Sargan (H0: no overidentification) 
show the p-value of the respective tests. 
 
 
 
 
Squared  
returns 
Absolute  
returns 
Realized  
volatility 
Std. dev. Z-score GARCH 
 
0.065*** 
(0.012) 
0.067*** 
(0.013) 
0.052*** 
(0.016) 
0.049*** 
(0.016) 
0.049*** 
(0.016) 
0.058*** 
(0.017) 
! 
("qit,T
d
#"qit,NT
d
)  
0.247* 
(0.145) 
0.267* 
(0.153) 
0.338** 
(0.175) 
0.329** 
(0.168) 
0.329*** 
(0.168) 
0.301* 
(0.173) 
! 
" pt
W
 
0.098 
(0.362) 
0.067 
(0.359) 
0.045 
(0.369) 
0.073 
(0.366) 
0.072 
(0.366) 
0.031 
(0.341) 
 
0.413*** 
(0.137) 
0.419*** 
(0.144) 
0.463*** 
(0.181) 
0.450*** 
(0.180) 
0.451*** 
(0.180) 
0.463*** 
(0.175) 
 
-0.022** 
(0.011) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.068* 
(0.041) 
Instrument 
list 
,
! 
("qit,T
d
#"qit,NT
d
)(#1 to # 8),
! 
" pt
W
, ,  
Hausman 0.702 0.628 0.479 0.477 0.636 0.206 
Breusch-
Godfrey 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Breusch Pagan 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan 0.738 0.932 0.778 0.908 0.898 0.525 
 0.280 0.258 0.201 0.197 0.196 0.230 
obs 288 288 288 288 288 288 
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Table 5: IV- Panel estimation results of nominal wage growth, 1999Q1 till 2006Q4, 
alternative productivity measure 
 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Hausman (H0: random effects), Breusch-
Pagan (H0: homoskedastic residuals), Breusch-Godfrey (H0: no serial correlation) and Sargan (H0: no overidentification) 
show the p-value of the respective tests. 
 
 
 
Squared  
returns 
Absolute  
returns 
Realized  
volatility 
Std. dev. Z-score GARCH 
 
0.080*** 
(0.005) 
0.088*** 
(0.004) 
0.073*** 
(0.007) 
0.067*** 
(0.008) 
0.068*** 
(0.008) 
0.078*** 
(0.005) 
! 
("qit,T
d
#"qit,NT
d
)  
0.307*** 
(0.073) 
0.354*** 
(0.073) 
0.390*** 
(0.115) 
0.389*** 
(0.118) 
0.389*** 
(0.118) 
0.434*** 
(0.112) 
! 
" pt
W
 
0.638* 
(0.340) 
0.671** 
(0.337) 
0.740** 
(0.372) 
0.758** 
(0.385) 
0.759** 
(0.385) 
0.711** 
(0.360) 
 
0.262*** 
(0.099) 
0.266*** 
(0.103) 
0.284** 
(0.131) 
0.287* 
(0.155) 
0.288* 
(0.156) 
0.332** 
(0.148) 
 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.047 
(0.040) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.126*** 
(0.041) 
Instrument 
List 
,
! 
("qit,T
d
#"qit,NT
d
)(#1 to # 8),
! 
" pt
W
, ,  
Hausman 0.858 0.838 0.183 0.466 0.902 0.068 
Breusch-
Godfrey 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Breusch Pagan 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan 0.996 0.998 0.998 0.539 0.477 0.335 
 0.317 0.321 0.188 0.143 0.143 0.238 
obs 256 256 256 256 256 256 
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The 
! 
" -coefficient isolates the discount/mark-up on wages due to uncertainty originating in 
exchange rate volatility. Exchange rate uncertainty has a significant negative impact on 
nominal wages when using the squared exchange rate returns, the absolute returns and the 
estimated GARCH variance series as proxies for exchange rate uncertainty at the 1 % 
significance level. Realized volatility, standard deviations as well as the z-score enter the 
equation insignificantly. To this end, the evidence for discount on nominal and real wages 
due to exchange rate uncertainty is mixed.  
 
All in all, we can summarize that the evidence for the Lindbeck model as formulated in 
equation (4) is mixed. There is, however, a high and significant negative relationship between 
exchange rates and nominal wage growth. The wage bargaining process seems to be strongly 
influenced by the exchange rate system. Trade unions and enterprises are forced to predict 
exchange rate changes next to productivity growth, which introduces additional uncertainty 
and costs in the wage determination process. This seems to result in bargaining for smaller 
wage increases.  
 
The impact of exchange rate uncertainty on wage growth remains mixed. In some 
specifications exchange rate uncertainty is linked with decreasing wages, but in some 
specifications this effect turns out to be insignificant. Nonetheless, our results based on the 
Lindbeck framework provide evidence that the exchange rate regime significantly matters for 
the wage determination process in the Central and Eastern European small open economies. 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
We analyzed the role of the exchange rate on the wage determination process in CEE, i.e. the 
question of if fixed or flexible exchange rates are the appropriate policy choice for emerging 
market economies from a labor market perspective. Up to now, exchange rate strategies 
differ across CEE, and there is a controversial discussion about the appropriate exchange rate 
system during the run-up to the EMU. The objectives of full employment, fair working 
conditions, productivity, employment and cohesion are at the centre of EU economic policy. 
In this context wage policies in CEE are an important issue for European economic policy 
making due to an increasing degree of labor market integration in the enlarged EU.  
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With the recent financial and economic crisis, the question about the appropriate exchange 
rate regime in CEE has gained further attention. The arguments in favor of exchange rate 
stability (in form of tight euro pegs or EMU membership) in combination with wage 
flexibility (which is necessary to adjust to asymmetric shocks within a monetary union) have 
gained new support for two reasons. First, given high external foreign currency denominated 
debt as it prevails in CEE, depreciations are not a viable tool in the face of recession. Second, 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic which had already joined the euro area before the crisis, 
were spared the hike in risk premiums on domestic interest rates because they had already 
joined the save haven of euro area capital markets.  
 
From a purely labor market perspective we derived from the Scandinavian model of wage 
determination that in small open economies, trade unions could reap a higher benefit in the 
form of higher real wage growth in countries with fixed exchange rates. This is partially 
supported by the econometric estimates. Therefore, it is claimed that fixed exchange rates can 
provide a welfare enhancing framework during the economic catch-up process. The 
assumption behind this conclusion is that exchange rate volatility causes transaction costs for 
the wage bargaining process, which are shifted from enterprises to workers. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Monetary Policy under Alternative Exchange 
Rate Regimes in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Monetary policy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) remains an important economic 
policy issue for European economic policy making (Fendel et al. (2009), Mohanty and Klau 
(2004)). Although macroeconomic stability in CEE has been growing since the CEE 
economies entered the European Union (EU) and began preparing for the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), different monetary policy and exchange rate strategies persist. While 
Lithuania, Latvia and Bulgaria are pegging their currencies tightly to the euro, the authorities 
in Romania, the Czech Republic and Poland allow their exchange rates to be largely 
determined by market forces. The central bank in Hungary has pursued managed floats, while 
Estonia (since 2011), Slovenia (since 2007) and the Slovak Republic (since 2009) are members 
of the EMU. 
 
Furthermore, monetary policy is an important determinant in the wage bargaining process, 
because enterprises and trade unions have to predict productivity changes and inflation as 
components of future real wage increases. Time-inconsistency in monetary policymaking may 
increase the uncertainty linked to the wage determination process. This may also apply to 
monetary policy under alternative exchange rate regimes. According to McKinnon and 
Schnabl (2006) and Mundell (1973) in small open economies this uncertainty widely depends 
on the exchange rate strategy. Under fixed exchange rates such as in the Baltics, monetary 
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policy is solely committed to an exchange rate peg. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, 
such as in the Czech Republic or Poland, monetary policy, however, is permitted a 
discretionary leeway (Mishkin 2000). Uncertainty for the wage bargaining process increases as 
the central bank pursues both an inflation and exchange rate target. 
 
We built on Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983a, b), who model 
time-inconsistency in monetary policy for a closed economy as they allow the central bank to 
switch between an output and an inflation target. We apply this framework to small open 
economies such as in CEE, where the central banks may switch from an inflation target to an 
exchange rate target to sustain output growth. If central banks can soften appreciation 
pressure by discretionary interest rate cuts, uncertainty and inflation may rise in the long-term 
and lead to increasing uncertainty in the wage bargaining process. Then, trade unions and 
enterprises are hindered to forecast, whether the rising nominal output is due to real 
productivity or inflation increases. 
 
We model monetary policy rules for five CEE countries, which officially announce or have 
announced to an inflation target, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia, and analyze if central banks react time-inconsistent and switch from the announced 
inflation target to an unannounced exchange rate target. We extend the seminal Taylor rule 
(Taylor 1993) for closed economies by an exchange rate term following Clarida et al. (1998) 
and Taylor (2001). As future expectations of output growth and inflation are important 
variables in the applied Taylor rule (e.g. Gorter et al. (2008)), we make use of survey data 
provided by the ifo World Economic Survey (WES). In addition, we include a dummy 
variable controlling for regime switches in monetary policy making.  
 
Our work is related to several studies analyzing monetary policy in emerging economies. 
Relatively few previous papers have scrutinized monetary policy in CEE to our knowledge. 
Frömmel and Schobert (2006) and Frömmel et al. (2009) analyze monetary policy with 
respect to policy changes and different exchange rate systems in CEE. Fendel et al. (2008) 
scrutinize interest rate reaction functions in emerging economies considering financial 
markets expectations, while Mohanty and Klau (2004) give an overview over monetary policy 
rules in emerging markets in general. By estimating Taylor rules with expectation data from 
surveys, this study is related to Henzel and Wollmershäuser (2008), who estimate a New 
Keynesian Philipps curve with ifo WES data and Gorter et al. (2008) and Sauer and Sturm 
 39!
(2007), which estimate Taylor rules with European Central Bank survey data. Our analysis 
contributes to the literature in two ways: First, we compare a broad range of different kind of 
Taylor rules for CEE, such as forward looking, backward looking or survey data based 
monetary policy rules with each other in order to derive implications for the wage bargaining 
process in CEE. Second, we allow for monetary policy regime switches by modeling 
asymmetric monetary policy reaction functions.23  
 
3.2. Monetary Policy in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
We analyze monetary policy settings in the five CEE economies, where central banks are or 
have been committed to an inflation target (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania). Those countries that officially have an exchange rate target and peg their exchange 
rate tightly to the euro such as the Baltics or Bulgaria are not considered in this study. Table 1 
gives a short overview about monetary and exchange rate strategies of the analyzed CEE 
economies in last 15 years. Most of the countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic focused on exchange rate targeting during the nineties and 
have mostly switched after the 1997/98 Asian and Russian financial crisis to inflation 
targeting. Romania officially has an inflation target since 2005, while its central bank did not 
officially announce a monetary policy strategy before that year. To analyze monetary policy in 
CEE, we derive several monetary policy reaction functions describing the interest rate setting 
to investigate, whether central banks in CEE are credibly committed to an announced price 
objective or if they have been tempted to act time-inconsistently and follow an exchange rate 
target as well.  
 
The analysis of time-inconsistency goes back to the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983 a,b), which can be seen as the theoretical foundation of 
the later discussed Taylor rules. They argue, that in a discretionary regime central banks are 
tempted to act time-inconsistent in the sense of announcing an official inflation target and 
finally diverge from this target to generate higher output. In detail, central banks may increase 
money supply and create a higher inflation rate than people expect to achieve a higher 
economic activity via lower real wages and to reduce the real value of the government’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23  The regime switches are modeled by either a dummy variable measuring the additional impact of exchange rate 
changes in time of an official inflation target or a rolling window regression approach. 
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nominal liabilities. However, the public and private sector understand the policymaker’s 
incentives and adjust their inflation expectations. This indicates that the average inflation rate 
and the corresponding costs of inflation will be higher than otherwise. Therefore, they argue 
that an enforced commitment on monetary behavior, as embodied in monetary policy 
reaction functions, helps to eliminate the potential for ex post surprises.  
 
Taylor (1993) first proposed an (empirical) monetary policy reaction function suggesting that 
interest rates would be changed according to the deviation of inflation from its target and an 
output gap. In addition to this framework, Taylor (2001) proposed an additional monetary 
policy reaction function with the exchange rate as a third possible target. He argued that 
central banks are not only be tempted to generate surprise inflation to temporarily stimulate 
output. Furthermore, he found that central banks might also switch from the inflation target 
to an exchange rate target to sustain output via surprise inflation.  
 
In the following we want to make use of monetary policy reaction functions to scrutinize 
whether the central banks of those CEE economies, which officially refer to an inflation 
target (see Table 1), are tempted to act time-inconsistent in the way of an unannounced target 
switching. In detail, we analyze if central banks may switch from the announced inflation 
target to an exchange rate target to stimulate economic growth. 
 
The reason for a time-inconsistent behavior in CEE may be founded on the fact that in 
emerging economies monetary policy aims to soften domestic appreciation pressure due to 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964, Samuelson 1964). Therefore, the monetary 
authority may tend to smooth that appreciation pressure, especially in times of moderate 
price inflation via discretionary interest rate cuts. As a consequence inflation may rise in the 
long-term and will be hard to predict. This leads to uncertainty and welfare losses in the 
public and private sector. Furthermore, due to this time-inconsistent behavior the uncertainty 
in the wage determination process in the economy will rise for three reasons.  
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Table 1: Monetary Policy Rules in CEE 
 
Country Montary Policy Strategy Exchange Rate System 
CZ • 1994–1997: Exchange rate target-
ing, credit volume and M2 
targeting 
• since 1998: Inflation targeting  
• Free floating since 1997, from 
1995 till 1997 managed float 
HU • 1994–2002: Exchange rate 
targeting (i.e. managed floats) 
• since 2002: Inflation targeting 
• Free floating since March 
2008, before managed floats 
PL • 1994–1998: Exchange rate 
targeting 
• since 1998: Inflation targeting 
• Free floating since 2000, from 
1995 till 2000 managed float 
RO • 1994–2005: No official monetary 
policy commitment 
• since 2005: inflation targeting 
• managed floats since 1994 
SK • 1994–1998: Exchange rate 
targeting 
• 1998–2008: Inflation targeting  
• since 2009: Euro system  
• Euro adoption 2009, since 
November 2005 till December 
2008: ERM2, before managed 
floats 
 
Source: ECB (2008) and European Commission (2007). 
 
 
First, for trade unions it is hard to distinguish between surprise and non-surprise inflation. 
They face a loss of predictive power in forecasting future inflation and productivity, which 
may lead to a decreasing bargaining power. Therefore, enterprises may act more restrained 
with respect to wage increases.24 Thus, (real) wages may be lower than in equilibrium.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24   Another possible scenario could be that the economy struggles into a wage-price-spiral, in which both sides of 
the wage bargain process try to keep up with inflation to protect real incomes. And may end in the worst case in 
a hyperinflation. 
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Second, because of anticipation of the time-inconsistent behavior the central bank may face a 
loss of credibility of economic agents, enterprises and investors even in later time periods. 
This may end in further uncertainty and instability, making it even harder to predict future 
output and inflation as important determinants for the wage setting process.  
 
Third, in emerging market economies there is a general need for greater monetary discipline 
against the backdrop of their relatively high inflation and low policy credibility (see Monhanty 
and Klau 2004). Calvo and Mishkin (2003) point out that emerging market economies are 
very vulnerable to “sudden stops” of capital inflows. Attributing financial crises in emerging 
market economies to their weak institutional credibility, Calvo and Mishkin (2003) propose 
that central banks in emerging economies should be subject to a constrained monetary policy 
making it harder for the central banks to pursue an “overly expansionary monetary policy”. If 
the central bank is not credible in its monetary policy objectives, the confidence of the 
investors, enterprises and trade unions may decrease as well. 
 
3.3. The Theoretical Taylor Rules 
 
To model the monetary policy in CEE, we follow Taylor (1993, 2001, 2002) and Clarida et al. 
(1998), who links the interest rate to an output and inflation gap:  
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To measure the extent of exchange rate changes on monetary policy, we extend the model by 
adding exchange rate changes into our open economy monetary policy reaction function (see 
f.e. Frömmel et al. 2009, Mohanty and Klau 2004): 
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Following Clarida et al. (1998) we introduce an interest rate smoothing parameter to smooth 
out shocks in the money market: 
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In contrast to the contemporaneous Taylor rule displayed in equation (4), the Taylor rule can 
be modeled as a forward-looking Taylor rule using expected future variables as proposed by 
Clarida et al. (1998, 2000): 
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E indicates expected values at t+j, where j indicates a future time period, which is in the 
literature mostly one year ahead. 
! 
"
t
 is the central banks information set available at time t. 
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Based on the forward-looking (5) and contemporaneous (4) Taylor rule we derive four 
different linear Taylor rules25 modeling monetary policy in CEE, which are empirically tested 
in section four. 
 
First, we built on the forward-looking Taylor rule (4) by implementing quarterly real inflation 
expectation data about the average of this year inflation drawn from the ifo WES survey
! 
E "
t+4 #t[ ]( ) , leading to the following linear equation: 
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The second Taylor rule is a standard forward-looking reaction function based on future 
inflation: 
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Third, we consider a Taylor rule taking the contemporaneous inflation into account (see 
Frömmel et al. (2009)) and transform equation (4) into a linear model: 
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25
  Due to the small sample size estimating the original non-linear Taylor with the term 
! 
(1" #) may lead to unstable 
results due to convergence process of the estimator. Therefore, we retransform our Taylor rules into linear 
models to generate a higher estimation quality. The size and the significance can be interpreted without any loss 
in information. 
26  Due to missing data about the future inflation targets 
! 
" t+4
* of the central bank rate 
! 
" t+4
*
 is captured by the 
constant term. For an empirical example in the literature see Danne and Schnabl (2008). 
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with 
! 
µ = (1" #)$, % = (1" #)&  and
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The last Taylor rule contains inflation, output and exchange rate expectation data from the 
ifo WES database: 
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In all our four different Taylor rule specifications the effect of exchange rate changes on 
interest rate setting is modeled time-independent, regardless whether monetary policy targets 
differ across the observation period. 
 
Therefore, we introduce an interaction term measuring the effect of exchange rate changes in 
periods, where the central bank officially relies on inflation targeting.  
The dummy takes the value one, if the central bank officially refers to inflation targets and 
zero otherwise. 
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Including this dummy in the Taylor rule with the expected inflation variable (6) yields the 
following transformation: 
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where the size of the 
! 
"  coefficient measures the effect of exchange rate changes on the 
interest rate, which is additionally triggered in the period of official inflation targeting The 
total effect of the exchange rate on monetary policy decisions during inflation targeting is 
measured by the sum of the coefficients
! 
" +# . It should be insignificant, if the central bank 
is strongly committed to the target and acts not time-inconsistent. 
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Introducing the interaction term into equation (7) yields the following forward-looking 
Taylor rule: 
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The contemporaneous Taylor rule derived in equation (8) takes the following form: 
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The Taylor rule based on expectation data (9) with respect to regime switches is displayed in 
equation (14): 
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As alternative method for analyzing whether the influence of exchange rate changes differs 
across the underlying period we implement a rolling window regression scheme. With a 
window size of 34 observations, which is shifted every period, we estimate the four standard 
Taylor rules to analyze, if the influence of the exchange rate term varies over time. 
 
3.4. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.4.1. Data  
 
Based on the four alternative Taylor rule specifications (expected inflation, forward looking, 
contemporaneous, only expectation data) derived in the last section, we analyze monetary policy 
rules for the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Romania (RO) and Slovakia 
(SK), which have announced official inflation targets within our data sample. The sample 
starts in the first quarter of 1995 and ends with the last quarter of 2008 (for Romania from 
1999 till 2008 due to data availability). Before 1995 data of the considered variables are very 
fragmented and can therefore not be used in the analysis.  
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The data partly built on expectation data drawn from the quarterly survey on the World 
Economic Survey (WES) collected by the ifo Institute for Economic Research in cooperation 
with the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris and is available on a quarterly basis. 
The participants of the survey, which are economic experts of international enterprises and 
institutions, are asked to give their assessment of the general economic situation regarding 
important macroeconomic indicators of the country they inhabit. Currently, the ifo WES asks 
about 1100 experts in 90 countries. The WES consists of quantitative and qualitative 
information: appraisals and expectations of economic experts (see Stangl 2007). We use the 
survey results regarding expected inflation (quantitative), expected exchange rate movements 
(qualitative) and expected economic performance (qualitative). 
 
All other data used in the empirical framework is taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics database. 
 
For the interest rate term 
! 
i
t
we use money market rates for the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania, and the Slovak Republic, while due to data unavailability the interest rate for 
Hungary is proxied by the average of the lending and deposit rate.  
 
The inflation term is calculated in several ways (see last section), which furthermore tests the 
robustness of our results. First, we implement the forward-looking inflation term (equations 
(7, 12)), where expected inflation is assumed to be equal to inflation one-year later !t+4. The 
inflation rate is calculated as the year-over-year change rate of consumer price indices.  
 
Second, we employ a contemporaneous inflation term (see Frömmel et al. (2009)), where the 
inflation gap is calculated by subtracting an inflation target !t* derived from the Maastricht 
criteria27 from actual inflation !t (equations (8, 13)).28 
 
The third measurement builds on survey data from the WES, where participants are asked 
each quarter about their inflation expectations for the current year (equations (6, 11) and (9, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27   1.5 percentage points higher than the average of the three lowest inflation member states of the EU. 
28   Siklos (2006) shows that taking this (external) “Maastricht inflation target” leads to more robust results than using 
the (internal) central bank target. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that not all of our considered countries 
implemented an official numeric inflation target over the whole sample period. Inflation targets may change in 
the underlying time period due to frequent price changes or macroeconomic shocks (see Frömmel et al. 2009).  
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14)).29 Figure 1 displays the inflation rate and the expected average inflation rate from the 
WES indicating, as expected, that the WES time series has a high explanatory power for 
(future) inflation movements with a correlation at time period t of more than 90 percent for 
all considered countries. 
 
The output gap 
! 
(yt " yt
*
) in equations (6), (7), (8) and (11), (12), (13) is based on real GDP 
using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with the smoothing parameter 1600 analogous to Fendel 
et al. (2008), where 
! 
yt refers to real GDP and 
! 
yt
*
to the filtered HP real GDP time series.  
 
As alternative measurement for the output gap in equations (9) and (14) (only expectation 
data Taylor rules), we take the survey results of the WES concerning the economic 
expectations in six months.  
 
In contrast to the quantitative inflation measure drawn from the WES, participants are asked 
for their qualitative expectations. The participants indicate up for an expected rise in the 
economic performance, same for no change and down for an expected fall in economic growth 
within the next six months. The grading scheme consists of giving a grade of 9 to the reply 
up, a grade of 5 to indifferent replies (same) and a grade of 1 to down replies. Average grades 
within the range of 5 to 9 indicate that a majority of experts expects an improvement of the 
economic situation, whereas grades within the range of 1 to 5 expect an economic downturn. 
Afterwards the individual replies are combined and averaged, which leads to a non-binary 
time-series. To interpret the direction (but not the size) of this variable in our regression30 we 
standardize the grading scheme, whereas a number significantly smaller than zero indicates an 
expected fall in the economic situation, a value significantly higher than zero an expected rise 
and not significantly different from zero the same economic performance31. Then, we 
smooth the non-binary standardized time series with the Hodrick-Prescott filter to calculate 
the output gap by the difference of the standardized and the detrended time series32. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29   In comparison to the other questions, the participants give a quantitative answer. 
30   Up till now the non-binary time series is distributed around 5. 
31
   An alternative method of converting qualitative data into quantitative data is the use of a Carlson-Parkin (1975) 
filter proposed by Henzel and Wollmershäuser (2005). However, due to a small sample size of participants of the 
WES for the CEE economies, this method cannot be considered in this study. 
32   Please note that such as in the case of the later estimation not the size of the coefficient itself, but the sign, can be 
used for interpretation. 
 49!
Moreover, the exchange rate changes in the equations (6), (7), (8) and (11), (12), (13) are 
modeled by the quarter-over-quarter exchange rate changes in volume notation, where <0 
indicates a domestic currency depreciation and >0 a currency appreciation against the euro 
(before 1999: Deutsche Mark).33  
 
Furthermore, we include for equations (9) and (14) (only expectation data) a proxy for 
exchange rate expectations with the help of the WES data. Here, the participants are asked if 
the domestic currency (i.e. Czech koruna, Polish zloty etc.) is at present overvalued (1), about 
at the proper value (5) or undervalued (9) to the euro. We make the debatable assumption 
that participants, in case of an undervaluation of the home currency (and therefore an 
overvaluation of the euro) expect a future appreciation of the home currency34 neglecting that 
participants could also expect no exchange rate movements. We standardize the graded time 
series and base in on the assumption that a value >0 suggests the expectation of a currency 
appreciation against the euro and <0 a depreciation against the euro.35 
 
To test for instatitionarity in the underlying variables we apply the augmented Dickey Fuller 
unit root test. We find no evidence for unit roots in the investigated time series and can reject 
the Null hypothesis of a unit root on the 10 percent significance level. Henceforth, we 
assume that neither cointegration nor spurious regressions are a matter of concern.  
 
3.4.2. Results 
 
Based on the theoretical Taylor rules derived in section 3.3, we estimate eight linear Taylor 
rules for the five CEE economies to analyze possible time-inconsistency in monetary 
possible. With other words we scrutinize whether monetary authorities behave time-
inconsistent and switch from an official inflation targeting to an exchange rate target to 
enhance higher output growth via surprise inflation. We employ a GMM estimator proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) with Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors to cope with possible endogeneity and autocorrelation. Up to four lags of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33   Please note, that for reasons of comparability with the WES exchange rate expectation data, the volume notation 
for exchange rate changes was chosen. 
34  Please note, that the overvaluation or undervaluation of the currency does not necessarily indicate a expected 
depreciation or appreciation.  
35  Please note that such as in the case of the output gap based on WES data, just the sign, but not the size of the 
coefficient itself can be used for interpretation. 
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endogenous variable as well as of the exogenous variables are used as instruments. The Null 
hypothesis of validity of instruments with Sargan-Test (Sargan 1958) cannot be rejected for 
all specifications.36 
 
In a first step, we estimate the Taylor rule with the expected inflation term drawn from the WES 
to model inflation expectations in CEE (equation 6). Second, we estimate the Taylor rules 
with a forward-looking inflation term proposed by Clarida (1998) (equation 7). Third, we 
implement a Taylor rule with a contemporaneous inflation term based on the Maastricht inflation 
target (equation 8). Forth, we estimate the Taylor rule with all available expectation data (only 
expectation data) from the WES, namely expected inflation, the output gap based on 
expectation about the economic situation in six months and the exchange rate term 
displaying appreciation or depreciation expectations37 (equation 9).  
 
In a next step, we run the Taylor rules regressions with the interaction term measuring the 
impact of exchange changes in monetary policy under different monetary policy frameworks 
(equations 11, 12, 13 and 14).  
 
Finally, we estimate the Taylor rules proposed by equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) in a rolling 
regression framework with a window size of 34 to analyze possible time-inconsistency in 
monetary policy patterns over time. 
 
The results of the estimated Taylor rules for the Czech Republic are displayed in Table 2. For 
the expected inflation, forward-looking and contemporaneous estimation frameworks the parameters 
have the expected signs and are significant at the common levels. The interest rate smoothing 
parameter is relatively high with approximately 0.7 and is for all estimations highly significant 
indicating that interest rate smoothing is prevalent in the monetary policy of the Czech 
Republic. The inflation parameter is also positive and highly significant. The output gap has a 
small, but positive and significant impact on the monetary policy setting. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36
   The respective p-values are displayed in Table 2 to 8. 
37   Please note, that interpretation of the coefficients demands caution due to the fact that we face qualitative instead 
of quantitative data.  
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Notes: Wald-test displays the F-statistics and in brackets the respective p-value of the Null hypothesis: 
! 
" +# = 0 . 
Table 2: Taylor rules, Czech Republic, 1995–2008 
 
 Expected inflation  Forward looking 
Variable 
(1)  
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
(2) 
 
Coef. Std. 
(3)  
 
Coef. Std. 
(4) 
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant  0.721*** 0.186 0.519*** 0.165 0.015 0.112 1.709*** 0.220 
Interest rate 
(t-1) 0.539*** 0.038 0.509*** 0.055 0.961*** 0.019 0.588*** 0.028 
Inflation  0.322*** 0.075 0.424*** 0.085 0.035*** 0.013 0.184*** 0.034 
Output gap 0.022* 0.011 0.003** 0.013 0.022*** 0.007 0.094*** 0.015 
Exchange 
rate -0.081*** 0.022 0.493*** 0.097 -0.029* 0.017 0.362*** 0.069 
Regime   -0.587*** 0.092   -0.426***  
Wald-test   21.84 (0.000)   19.89 (0.000) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.773  0.751  0.760  0.763  
Sargan 0.07  0.07  0.19  0.08  
obs 56  56  52  52  
 Contemporaneous Only expectation data 
Variable 
(5)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(6)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(7) 
 
Coef. Std.  
(8)  
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant  0.779*** 0.145 0.680*** 0.136 -0.769** 0.319 -0.027 0.239 
Interest rate 
(t-1) 0.798*** 0.030 0.828*** 0.029 0.196*** 0.025 0.907*** 0.038 
Inflation  0.142*** 0.035 0.142*** 0.036 1.018*** 0.088 0.098 0.088 
Output gap 0.014** 0.005 0.016*** 0.006 -0.004 0.024 0.021** 0.009 
Exchange 
rate -0.035*** 0.009 0.165*** 0.042 -1.131*** 0.341 3.069*** 0.650 
Regime   -0.196*** 0.043   -1.359** 0.619 
Wald-test   17.29 (0.000)   3.49 (0.067) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.783  0.785  0.768  0.712  
Sargan 0.121  0.08  0.102  0.08  
obs 56  56  60  60  
 52!
The results deliver a strong empirical evidence for a significant impact of exchange rate 
changes on Czech Republic monetary policy next to inflation and output indicating that a 
currency appreciation leads to decreasing interest rates.  
 
Although, the Czech Republic did not commit officially to an exchange rate target for the 
whole observation period, the results deliver evidence that monetary policy possibly behaved 
time-inconsistent in the sense of switching from the announced inflation target to an 
exchange rate target to generate higher output.  
 
When interpreting the results of the regressions, where the effect of the exchange rate is 
modeled by the interaction dummy, taking the value one, when the Czech Republic officially 
announces an inflation target from 1998 on and zero otherwise, the effect of the exchange 
rate on monetary policy making is negative (exchange rate plus coefficient) and significant 
such as in the previous estimation frameworks without the interaction term.38 This indicates 
that even if monetary policy in the Czech Republic refers to an official inflation target after 
1998, the central bank seems to soften currency appreciation pressure by discretionary 
interest rate cuts.  
 
This observed time-inconsistency can lead to uncertainty in the economy with higher 
inflation rates in the long-term and therefore increasing uncertainty in the Czech wage 
determination process (with probably lower real wages). The results (t-statistics (solid line), 
coefficient of the exchange rate term (dashed line)) of the rolling window estimation (Figure 
2, Chart 1) support our findings. They find an (not officially) announced influence of 
exchange rate changes and shows a significant impact (solid line) of the exchange rate on 
monetary policy for most of the observed time period. Just in 2007 Q2 and Q3 there seems 
to be no significant impact of the exchange rate on the Czech monetary policy pattern.  
 
The empirical results for the Taylor rules of Hungary (Table 3) are mainly in line with the 
results for the Czech Republic. The regressions reveal a positive and significant impact of the 
lagged interest rate and inflation on Hungarian monetary policy in all of the four estimation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38    The results within frameworks, where mainly expectation data is used remain, however, widely support our    
      findings concerning the exchange rate term. On the one hand, the exchange rate term for the overall equation is     
      again negative and significant whereas the overall effect in the time after 1998 (equation 7) is positive, but  
      insignificant.  
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settings. The output gap is positive, but not significant in all frameworks.39 However, in 
comparison to the regressions for the Czech Republic, the impact of exchange rate changes 
on monetary policy setting is mixed. For the overall period, three estimation set-ups 
(expected inflation, forward-looking, contemporaneous) indicate a negative and significant 
impact of the exchange rate changes on the interest rate; thus, the central bank seems to 
soften currency appreciation pressure by discretionary interest rate cuts.  
 
However, controlling for the regime switch by the interaction term in Hungarian monetary 
policy after 2002 (from exchange rate to inflation targeting), the impact of exchange rate 
changes remains negative40, but is insignificant for most specifications. Only the 
contemporaneous Taylor rule indicates a negative and significant impact of the exchange rate in 
times of official inflation announcements.  
 
The results of rolling window regression find indeed a strong and significant impact of 
exchange rate changes on monetary policy (Figure 2, Chart 2). It shows that the exchange 
rate term has a strong negative impact on monetary policy making after 2002 (period of 
official inflation targeting).  
 
Even if the influence of the exchange rate on monetary policy in times of inflation targeting 
is not as clear as for the Czech Republic (for some settings it is in fact negative as well, but 
insignificant), we may conclude that Hungarian policy makers permit a discretionary leeway in 
monetary policy decisions to some extent. This may have led to possible welfare losses in the 
Hungarian wage determination process as well. 
 
The results of the different estimated Taylor rules for Poland are displayed in Table 4. In all 
regressions inflation, interest rate and output gap have the expected positive sign and are 
(with the exception of the output gap in (7) and (8)) significant. The exchange rate term41 is 
negative and significant, indicating that a domestic currency appreciation leads to a decreasing 
interest rate.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39   In the Taylor rule specification (only expectation data) the output gap coefficient is negative and not significant. 
40 In the Taylor rule specification (only expectation data) the exchange rate coefficient is positive but highly 
insignificant. Due to the unconventional transformation of the survey data, this result must been treated with 
caution. 
41  In the Taylor rule specification (only expectation data) the exchange rate coefficient is again positive but highly 
insignificant. 
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Notes: Wald-test displays the F-statistics and in brackets the respective p-value of the Null hypothesis: 
! 
" +# = 0  
Table 3: Taylor rules, Hungary, 1995–2008 
 
 Expected inflation  Forward looking 
Variable 
(1)  
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
(2) 
 
Coef. Std. 
(3)  
 
Coef. Std. 
(4) 
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant  1.349*** 0.293 1.558*** 0.375 0.677** 0.257 0.418 0.500 
Interest rate 
(t-1)  0.609*** 0.073 0.583*** 0.094 0.837*** 0.032 0.819*** 0.072 
Inflation  0.240*** 0.063 0.249*** 0.074 0.008*** 0.023 0.106*** 0.023 
Output gap -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.009*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.002 
Exchange 
rate -0.045*** 0.015 -0.058 0.044 -0.058*** 0.014 -0.082 0.071 
Regime   0.017 0.083   0.079 0.111 
Wald-test   0.87 (0.355)   0.05 (0.943) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.966  0.965  0.967  0.962  
Sargan 0.08  0.09  0.15  0.14  
obs 52  52  48  48  
 Contemporaneous Only expectation data 
Variable 
(5)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(6)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(7) 
 
Coef. Std.  
(8)  
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant  1.129*** 0.405 1.124*** 0.404 1.470*** 0.517 1.632*** 0.323 
Interest rate 
(t-1) 0.771*** 0.061 0.787*** 0.059 0.629*** 0.094 0.617*** 0.055 
Inflation  0.126*** 0.043 0.139*** 0.043 0.220*** 0.077 0.221*** 0.058 
Output gap,  0.005*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.103 0.228 -0.128 0.161 
Exchange 
rate -0.054** 0.023 0.018 0.005 1.136** 0.547 0.693 0.497 
Regime   -0.120 0.058   1.555 1.194 
Wald-test   30.57 (0.000)   1.77 (0.187) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.956  0.971  0.961  0.957  
Sargan 0.15  0.14  0.11  0.10  
obs 52  52  68  68  
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Notes: Wald-test displays the F-statistics and in brackets the respective p-value of the Null hypothesis: 
! 
" +# = 0 . 
Table 4: Taylor rules, Poland, 1995–2008 
 
 Expected inflation  Forward looking 
Variable 
(1)  
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
(2) 
 
Coef. Std. 
(3)  
 
Coef. Std. 
(4) 
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant  2.090*** 0.328 0.757*** 0.073 1.052*** 0.339 0.190 0.126 
Interest rate 
(t-1) 0.703*** 0.043 0.730*** 0.019 0.843*** 0.031 0.892*** 0.009 
Inflation  0.176*** 0.037 0.209*** 0.029 0.098*** 0.027 0.088*** 0.013 
Output gap 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
Exchange 
rate -0.023** 0.009 0.104** 0.048 -0.002 0.009 0.076* 0.039 
Regime   -0.119** 0.051   -0.087** 0.004 
Wald-test   7.73 (0.007)   6.55 (0.014) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.962  0.949  0.973  0.967  
Sargan 0.11  0.05  0.15  0.05  
obs 52  52  48  48  
 Contemporaneous Only expectation data 
Variable 
(5)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(6)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(7) 
 
Coef. Std.  
(8)  
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant  0.943*** 0.282 1.054*** 0.162 0.832*** 0.186 0.155 0.458 
Interest rate 
(t-1) 0.865*** 0.034 0.811*** 0.017 0.825*** 0.036 0.777*** 0.044 
Inflation  0.165*** 0.038 0.111*** 0.029 0.043* 0.024 0.334*** 0.066 
Output gap 0.000*** 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.113 0.216 0.207 0.258 
Exchange 
rate -0.017* 0.009 -0.030 0.108 -0.726 0.502 -2.160 1.451 
Regime   0.022 0.103   2.630 2.581 
Wald-test   1.03 (0.134)   0.058 (0.810) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.975  0.971  0.949  0.972  
Sargan 0.08  0.14  0.05  0.08  
obs 52  52  68  56  
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The Polish central bank switched in 1998 from exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting. 
Analyzing the regressions controlling for the regime switch leads to mixed results. The results 
of the expected (Table 4, 1) and forward-looking regression (Table 4, 3) indicates that in the time 
of official exchange rate targeting (before 1998), a currency depreciation is linked to 
decreasing interest rates: The effect after 1998 in times of official inflation targeting in 
estimation framework is negative (exchange rate + regime) and significant. 
 
However, in the contemporaneous framework the impact of the exchange rate is insignificant. 
All in all, this leads us to the conclusion that the Polish monetary policy may have acted time-
inconsistent in periods of inflation targeting with a switch from the inflation target in favor of 
an exchange rate target to sustain output. However, the effect is not as strong observable as 
for the Czech Republic. 
 
Figure 2 (Chart 3) shows the t-statistics and coefficient of the exchange rate term of the 
rolling window regression. In comparison to the static estimations, the exchange rate 
coefficient has a significant positive coefficient and not as expected a negative impact on the 
interest rate for most of the underlying time period. Therefore, we find just to some extend 
evidence that Polish monetary policy makers incorporate the exchange rate into monetary 
policy decisions.  
 
While we find in most of the regression frameworks a possible time-inconsistent behavior 
(exchange targeting in times of official inflation targeting) in monetary policy, the 
contemporaneous and rolling window specifications find no time-inconsistency and therefore no 
additional uncertainty arising from Polish monetary policy for the wage setting process. 
 
The estimation results for Romania (Table 5) are in line with the results for the previous 
considered countries. The interest rate smoothing parameter and inflation parameter are 
positive and highly significant. The influence of the output gap on the interest rate is positive, 
but just in half of the specifications significant. The exchange rate parameter is negative, but 
not in all frameworks significant.  
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Interpreting the results of the estimation framework allowing for a regime switch in monetary 
policy42 leads to the following conclusion: The overall impact of the exchange rate on the 
interest rate after 2005 (official inflation target) is indeed negative, but insignificant.43. 
 
The rolling t-statistics indicates are as well negative and indicates a significant impact of 
currency appreciation on interest rates. In all, the results deliver therefore just small evidence, 
that in Romanian central bankers act time-inconsistent and switch between an (informal) 
exchange rate target and an inflation target.  
 
The results for Slovakia are relatively similar to the results of the Czech Taylor rules. The 
interest rate smoothing parameter is positive and significant. Inflation has a positive and 
significant impact on the interest rate setting. Surprisingly, the inflation term in the 
contemporaneous model has no significant impact. The output gap with exception of equation 
(7) and (8) is positive and mostly significant.  
 
The exchange rate term is highly significant indicating that an appreciation of the Slovak 
crown leads to decreasing interest rates, which is in line with results from other studies (f.e. 
Frömmel et al. 2009). The exchange rate effect in periods with official inflation targets (from 
1998 till 2008) are also negative and significant indicating that Slovakian monetary 
policymakers permit a discretionary leeway with respect to exchange rate changes. 
 
Analyzing the t-statistics and coefficient of the rolling regression framework supports our 
findings. We see a strong and negative impact from exchange rates on Slovakian interest rate 
setting in most of the time of official inflation targeting (from 1998 till 2008). This observed 
time-inconsistency may have led to higher inflation rates in the long-term and increasing the 
uncertainty in the Slovakian wage determination process and the whole economy.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42  Before 2005 the monetary authorities of Romania gave no official commitment to a monetary policy strategy 
before they announced an inflation target. 
43   In the estimation scheme where we analyze the interest setting behavior (with the expectation of the interest rate) 
mainly with survey data the exchange rate effect is mixed and not robust such as for the other considered 
countries. 
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Notes: Wald-test displays the F-statistics and in brackets the respective p-value of the Null hypothesis: 
! 
" +# = 0 . 
Table 5: Taylor rules, Romania, 1999–2008 
 
 Expected inflation  Forward looking 
Variable 
(1)  
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
(2) 
 
Coef. Std. 
(3)  
 
Coef. Std. 
(4) 
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant  1.979*** 0.447 2.245*** 0.462 -0.067 0.970 5.085*** 1.280 
Interest rate 
(t-1) 0.428*** 0.057 0.624*** 0.028 0.388*** 0.034 0.132*** 0.042 
Inflation  0.511*** 0.073 0.225*** 0.035 1.031*** 0.134 0.783*** 0.104 
Output gap 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Exchange 
rate -0.084* 0.050 -0.292** 0.029 -0.049 0.067 -0.495*** 0.092 
Regime   0.254*** 0.069   0.458 0.311 
Wald-test   0.248 (0.621)   0.021 (0.885) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.842  0.928  0.829  0.804  
Sargan 0.13  0.14  0.16  0.17  
obs 40  40  40  40  
 Contemporaneous Only expectation data 
Variable 
(5)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(6)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(7) 
 
Coef. Std.  
(8)  
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant ,  3.033*** 0.479 3.278*** 0.674 1.930** 0.741 -1.811*** 0.557 
Interest rate 
(t-1) 0.605*** 0.071 0.589*** 0.068 0.883*** 0.044 0.812*** 0.038 
Inflation  0.185** 0.069 0.204*** 0.067 0.099 0.087 0.347*** 0.027 
Output gap 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Exchange 
rate -0.108*** 0.039 -0.095* 0.051 -2.152 1.358 10.869*** 1.315 
Regime   -0.056 0.207   -6.155*** 1.690 
Wald-test   0.699 (0.498)   17.91 (0.000) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.768  0.767  0.910  0.913  
Sargan 0.10  0.10  0.21  0.18  
obs 40  40  40  40  
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Notes: Wald-test displays the F-statistics and in brackets the respective p-value of the Null hypothesis: 
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Table 6: Taylor rules, Slovakia, 1995–2008 
 
 Expected inflation  Forward looking 
Variable 
(1)  
 
Coef. 
Std. 
Error 
(2) 
 
Coef. Std. 
(3)  
 
Coef. Std. 
(4) 
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant  1.247*** 0.202 0.891*** 0.191 1.596*** 0.443 1.368 0.950 
Interest rate 
(t-1) 0.754*** 0.023 0.864*** 0.011 0.759*** 0.039 0.808*** 0.061 
Inflation  0.075** 0.029 0.039 0.025 0.132** 0.061 0.235** 0.110 
Output gap 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Exchange 
rate -0.075*** 0.017 0.858*** 0.057 -0.155*** 0.034 0.220*** 0.247 
Regime   -0.925*** 0.052   -0.783*** 0.269 
Wald-test   23.59 (0.000)   12.62 (0.000) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.793  0.827  0.789  0.555  
Sargan 0.05  0.05  0.16  0.08  
obs 52  52  48  48  
 Contemporaneous Only expectation data 
Variable 
(5)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(6)  
 
Coef. Std.  
(7) 
 
Coef. Std.  
(8)  
 
Coef. Std.  
Constant , 
C(6) 1.137*** 0.181 1.495*** 0.277 -0.405** 0.174 1.154*** 0.163 
Interest rate 
c(1) 0.877*** 0.014 0.772*** 0.034 0.899*** 0.023 0.776*** 0.005 
Inflation c(2) 0.039 0.039 0.004 0.028 0.091** 0.035 0.060*** 0.021 
Output gap, 
c(3) 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.149 0.122 -0.000 0.000 
Exchange 
rate, c(4) -0.090*** 0.018 1.375*** 0.122 -1.470*** 0.242 1.727*** 0.194 
Regime*er   -1.459*** 0.120   -3.230*** 0.420 
Wald-test   15.71 (0.000)   9.59 (0.000) 
R-squared 
adj. 0.801  0.767  0.811  0.810  
Sargan 0.11  0.10  0.16  0.10  
obs 52  52  52  52  
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3.5. Conclusions 
 
In this study we analyzed the monetary policy in five CEE economies. We scrutinize whether 
countries that officially announce an inflation target are tempted to act inconsistently and 
switch from an inflation target to an exchange rate target to sustain higher output growth (via 
surprise inflation). We analyze the switching behavior between an exchange rate and an 
inflation target with the help of several empirical Taylor rules including, among other 
variables, ifo WES expectation data to describe central bank’s interest rate setting in CEE. 
 
Especially in countries in the economic catch-up process, macroeconomic stability and 
credible monetary authority are necessary tools to establish economic growth and welfare. 
Due to the integration process and due to the fact that all new member countries have to join 
the EMU, central bankers should aim to increase economic confidence and macroeconomic 
stability to join the EMU as soon as possible.44  
 
If central banks in CEE are not credible in their policy announcement and switch between 
non-announced exchange rate and inflation targets, they will conduct surprise inflation, 
which is anticipated by the public and private sector in form of higher inflation expectations. 
This will result in higher long-term inflation and uncertainty. Furthermore, it is much harder 
for enterprises to distinguish between real productivity growth and (surprise) inflation. This 
may result in a possible loss of bargaining power, second round effects as well as in 
unsteadiness for the wage setting process, where enterprises and trade unions have to predict 
productivity and inflation as components of future wages. 
 
The results from the econometric analysis support those assumptions. The empirical Taylor 
rules perform relatively well and are in line with the standard theory (see Clarida et al. 1998). 
Introducing an interaction term measuring the effect of exchange rate changes on the interest 
rate in periods of official inflation targeting shows that monetary authorities have partly 
followed an exchange rate target also in times of an official inflation target.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44  Another possibility could be to switch to an exchange rate target such as in the Baltics, which leads to further 
security in capital markets and decreasing competitiveness (see Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008) and ends in higher 
wages growth due to better predictability in the wage bargaining process (see Schnabl and Ziegler 2011). 
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In detail, for the Czech Republic and Slovakia we observe that the monetary authorities 
consider an exchange rate change also in times of official inflation targeting. For Poland, 
Romania and Hungary the evidence that monetary authorities focus on exchange rate 
changes in periods of inflation targeting is mixed. However, the results indicate partly that the 
monetary authorities have softened appreciation pressure by discretionary interest rate cuts 
without any official announcement. 
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3.7. Annex 
Figure 1: Inflation and expected inflation (quarterly data y-o-y percentage changes) 
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Source: IMF, ifo WES data.
 
 
 67!
Figure 2: T-statistics (left axis) and coefficient (right axis) of the exchange rate 
impact of rolling GMM Results   
!
!
!
!
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Notes: authors calculations based on IMF data. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Testing Predictive Ability of Business Cycle 
Indicators for the Euro Area45 
 
Published as ifo Working Paper, 69, 200946 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The euro area is a rather new subject in the literature on macroeconomic forecasting next to 
individual national country forecasts. Nonetheless, predictions for the euro zone gain more 
and more political attention. Especially, the European Central Bank conducts its monetary 
policy explicitly with a view on the economic development in whole euro area. Therefore, the 
forward-looking elements of this policy require accurate forecasts of inflation and economic 
activity. In this paper, we focus on forecasting euro area industrial production, which is the 
timeliest “hard indicator” of aggregate output that is available. Specifically, we assess whether 
several popular “soft indicators” such as euro area business cycle indicators reveal early 
information that helps to improve the accuracy of industrial production forecasts. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"#!!This paper is the foundation for a later paper co-authored with Prof. Dr. Kai Carstensen and Dr. Klaus    
      Wohlrabe, namely „Predictive ability of business cycle indicators under test: A case study for the euro area    
      industrial production”, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 2011, 231, 1, 82–106. 
46  This paper was presented at the workshop „Makroökonomik und Konjunktur“ at the ifo institute Dresden as well 
as at the Ph.D. seminar at HHL Leipzig. 
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The analysis of business cycles and its characteristics in the euro area is as well highly relevant 
for the new member states of the European Union (EU). With the entrance in the EU, all 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies have to join the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), (Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia have entered the EMU in 2011, 2009 and 2007) and 
are therefore highly interested in policy issues concerning the euro area.47  
 
Furthermore, business cycle movements in the euro area could effect the CEE economies 
directly due to possible spillover effects. Due to the fact, that the main trading partners of the 
CEE economies belong to the euro area, CEE enterprises are especially interested in reliable 
predictions of the economic development to derive possible implications for their own 
economic performance.  
 
Moreover, for small open economies with relatively large export sectors such as in CEE, 
precise predictions of the economic performance of the main trading partners are important 
with respect to own future earnings. If for example a main trading partner struggles into a 
crisis, it is likely that its production and consumption will decline, which results in shrinking 
import demand leading to declining export sales volume for the small open economy.  
 
Thus, reliable business cycle indicators for the euro area help enterprises, policy makers and 
trade unions in the CEE economies to predict future exports revenues. The higher the 
uncertainty about future exports, the higher will be the uncertainty in the wage determination 
process, where trade unions face a loss of bargaining power. CEE economies, which fix the 
exchange rate tightly to the euro and which cannot offset a negative (positive) productivity 
shock by currency depreciation (appreciation), are especially interested in reliable projections 
for the euro zone, particularly at forecasting turning points (i.e. recessions and booms).  
 
In this paper, we analyze seven business cycle indicators for the euro area that have been 
developed by research institutes, banks and the European Commission in order to improve 
forecasts and reduce uncertainty. These indicators are important tools for enterprises, central 
bankers and politicians to predict the future economic development. The indicators are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"$!Euro area economic growth is besides unemployment and inflation one important target variable in the decision   
     process of European policy makers. 
.
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constructed in different methodological ways, but are all well-respected for predicting 
business cycle movements within the euro area.  
 
Up to our knowledge the forecasting abilities of euro area business cycle indicators have not 
been analyzed from a comparative perspective in the empirical literature so far. A great deal 
of literature concentrates on the forecasting abilities of “hard indicators” such as the interest 
rate spread or indicators such as M2 growth (see Dovern and Ziegler (2008)). At forecasting 
real GDP our paper is related to a rather extensive literature that assesses the forecasting 
properties of various leading indicators for Germany such as by Breitung and Jagodzinski 
(2001), Schumacher and Dreger (2004), Fritsche and Stephan (2002), Hüfner and Schröder 
(2002), Schumacher (2007) or Kholodilin and Siliverstovs (2006) and for the euro area (just 
for the EuroCoin indicator) such as Forni et al. (2003). 
 
The comparison of the business cycle indicators is conducted in two ways: the in-sample and 
the out-of-sample analysis. The former uses all available information to estimate cross-
correlations between the indicators and euro area output and to test for Granger causality.  
 
The latter tries to mimic a realistic situation where the future is unknown. We make use of 
the bivariate vector autoregressive framework to generate one-step ahead forecasts of year-
over-year growth of industrial production which serves as the reference series. Our choice is 
motivated by the fact that this series is available at a monthly frequency implying a larger 
number of observations compared to the quarterly GDP series.  
 
4.2. Database 
 
Our reference series is the year-over-year (y-o-y) growth rate of the industrial production 
index for the euro area published by Eurostat, which is available at a monthly frequency.48  
In addition, we have a balanced sample size across indicators, which spans from 1991M02 to 
2007M07.!!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48   
Alternatively, we may have used the quarterly recorded GDP but this would imply a much smaller sample size.
 
 72!
!!! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!  
 
Figure 1: Business Cycle Indicators 
 
 
We consider seven different euro area business cycle indicators (see Table 1) to scrutinize 
how successful these indicators are at forecasting euro area economic growth. The seven 
alternative indicators are provided by newspapers, banks or economic research centers in 
order to predict future trends of the European business activity. The different types of 
indicators can be clustered into three different groups. Indicators belonging to the first class 
are based on economic surveys. The European Sentiment Indicator (ESI) and the Business 
and Climate Indicator (EJ) are constructed by the European Commission and mirror 
economic expectations of about 125 000 firms and almost 40 000 consumers in the EU. 
 
The ESI indicator is based on survey results from different confidence indicators, where 
enterprises (industry, services, retail, construction) and consumers are asked for their 
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economic expectations regarding the EU. We analyze the consumer confidence indicator 
(CFI), which is part of the ESI indicator separately, due to its good forecast performance in 
former studies (see Kholodilin and Siliverstovs (2006). Furthermore, we include the business 
climate indicator from the European Commission (EJ), where EU enterprises and economic 
experts are asked for their current business situation as well as for their business expectations. 
Next to these survey indicators provided by the European Commissions, we analyze a survey 
indicator by the Centre for European Economic Research in Mannheim (ZEW). This 
indicator captures economic expectations for the euro area from 350 different business and 
financial experts in Germany, the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France and Italy.49  
 
The second category includes composite indicators. In contrast to the survey indicators, these 
indicators are constructed with the help of different “hard” indicators such as order flows, 
production, interest rates, job vacancies etc., which are assumed to have explanatory power 
and leading abilities for euro area economic growth. The group of composite indicators 
covers the indicator proposed by the DZ bank (FAZ), which is monthly published in the 
“Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”. Furthermore, we consider the euro area composite 
indicator by the OECD (OECD) . 
 
The last category of indicators contains the EuroCoin (EC) indicator. This European 
business cycle indicator is constructed with a dynamic factor model (Forni et al. (2003), 
Altissimo et al. (2006)) and is monthly published by the CEPR in London.50 More than one 
hundred different time series from the euro area and EU are extracted with a principal 
component analysis and are used for the construction of the EC indicator to forecast euro 
area economic growth.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49
  The ZEW indicator for the Euro Area is available since 1999. Before 1999 we take results from ZEW indicator 
for Germany as a proxy for the euro are. The correlation between the ZEW euro area and the ZEW Germany 
indicator is roughly 85 percent. 
50  For a broad discussion of the different kinds of dynamic factor models see Eickmeier and Ziegler (2008). 
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Table 1: Overview of different indicators
Indicator Components Source
European Sentiment Indicator (ESI) Industry Confidence Indicator, European Commission
Services Confindence Indicator
Consumer Confidence Indicator (CFI)
Construction Confidence Indicator
Retail Trade Confidence Indicator
Business Climate Indicator (EJ) Industry survey about: production European Commission
trends in recent months, order books
export order books, stocks and
production expectations
FAZ-Euro-Indicator (FAZ) New job vacancies, order entries, DZ-Bank
Reuter purchasing manager´s index
(PMI), building and planning
permissions, production, interest rate
spreads, consumer confidence, Morgan-
Stanley- Capital-International Index,
real money (M3)
OECD Composite Indicator (OECD) Composite by individual OECD Organisation for
indicators for EU-12: variables for Economic Co-operation
surveys by research institutes, new job and Development (OECD)
vacancies, orders inflow/demand,
spread of interest rates, production,
finished goods stocks, passenger car
registration, other national indicators
ZEW Indicator of Economic Medium-term expectations for Centre for European
Sentiment (ZEW) development of the macroeconomic Economic Research
trend, inflation rate, short-term and (ZEW)
long-term interest rates, stockmarket,
exchange rates, profit situation of
different German industries (only
financial experts)
EuroCoin (EC) Data from 11 categories: industrial Centre for Economic
production, producer prices, monetary Policy Research
aggregates, interest rates, financial (CEPR)
variables, exchange rates, surveys by
the European Commission, surveys
by national institutes, external trade,
labour market
4
 75!
 
4.3. In-Sample-Analysis 
 
First, we compute cross-correlations between the respective euro area business cycle 
indicators and euro area industrial production for various lags and leads to analyze at which 
time the indicator series is highly correlated with the reference series. Then, we test for 
Granger causality between the indicators and the reference series within a bivariate vector 
autoregressive framework.  
 
4.3.1. Stationarity Test 
 
The growth rates of the business cycle indicators and euro area industrial growth are 
displayed in Figure 1. To test, if the indicators are subject to possible instatitionarity, which 
may lead to spurious estimations or predications, if the time series are not cointegrated 
(Johansen 1991), we apply the KPSS stationarity test (Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)). The results 
of the KPSS test, which is applied to demeaned (denoted as c in Table 2) or detrended data 
(denoted as c, t) can be found in Table 2.51 The KPPS test confirms that all time series are 
stationary (p-values >0.05), because the Null hypothesis of stationary data cannot be rejected 
at the five significance level.  
 
                  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51  If the detrended or demeaned test is applied depends on the property of the indicator time series. If the time 
series has a mean significant from zero the time series has to be detrended. If the time series has an obvious 
trend, the time series has to be furthermore detrended to cope for possibly biases in the test statistic. 
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4.3.2. Cross Correlation Analysis 
 
The cross-correlation analysis scrutinizes the correlation between the growth rate of the euro 
area industrial production as reference series and the growth rates of the different business 
cycle indicators. The cross-correlation coefficient, which takes values between 0 (no 
correlation) and 1 (-1) (perfect positive (negative) correlation), for lag k=-12,...,0,...,12 is given 
by the correlation coefficient between the reference series yt and the indicator xt-k. If the 
business cycle indicator is leading the reference series, the cross-correlation should be as high 
as possible and as close to 1 for positive values of k. The results are shown in Table 3.  
 
The CFI and EJ indicator are not leading, but lagging the reference series in the sense that 
their maximal cross-correlation coefficient is associated with a negative value of k. The other 
underlying business cycle indicators seem to have a predictive power and are leading the euro 
area industrial production. For example, the ZEW indicator reaches its highest correlation 
(0.696) at k=5 implying that it leads the reference series for five months, while the EC 
indicator is highly correlated (0.88) with the reference series at k=2. 
 
                 
 
 
4.3.3. Granger Causality Test 
 
To further analyze the in-sample properties of the business cycle indicators, we apply the 
Granger causality test (Granger (1969)). The test analyzes whether a business cycle indicator 
xt-p can improve the prediction of the reference series yt.  
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To put it differently, we ask if lagged values of xt-p exhibit prediction ability for euro area 
industrial production yt. To perform this test, a VAR model of order p=2 is estimated: 
 
     (1) 
,     (2) 
 
where  and  are assumed to be white noise processes. For testing whether the different 
business cycle indicators have explanatory power for euro area industrial production, the null 
hypothesis can be expressed as parameter restrictions in the VAR model, i.e. 
. If the Null hypothesis can be rejected, the business cycle indicator xt-p 
is Granger causal for the reference series and therefore has explanatory power for forecasting 
euro area industrial production growth.  
 
Table 4 contains the results of the Granger causality test. Since all p-values are zero, the Null 
hypothesis has to be rejected and we conclude that all business cycle indicators have a 
significant in-sample predictive power in the sense of Granger and are able to explain 
economic growth in the euro area.  
 
 
                                
 
 
4.4. Out-of-Sample Analysis 
 
4.4.1. Forecasting Design 
 
The VAR model described in the previous section is a standard framework in 
macroeconomic forecasting. To analyze the out-of-sample properties of the underlying seven 
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indicators xt, we generate one-step (forecast horizon: h=1) forecasts building on equation (1) 
from the VAR model introduced in the last section. To evaluate the forecasts properties we 
spilt the data sample into two parts. The estimation sample period (1991M2 till 2001M12) is 
applied for estimating equation (1).52 Then, we take the estimated coefficients and calculate a 
future value (one-step ahead of the reference series (see equation 3)). Later on, we can 
compare the forecasted value yft+1 with the realized value yt+1. (subsection 4.2.2).  
 
! 
yt+h
f
="
0
+"
1
yt+h#1 + ....+" p yt+h# p + $1xt+h#1 + ....+ $ p xt+h# p      (3) 
 
In our forecasting experiment the consistent Schwarz (BIC) criterion (Schwarz 1978) is used 
in each forecasting step, to choose the optimal lag length p in the VAR model. We select a 
simple autoregressive model (AR) with lagged values of the reference series as benchmark 
model for reasons of forecasts comparisons : 
 
! 
yt ="0 +"1yt#1 + ....+"k yt#k + ut $ yt+h
f
="
0
+"
1
yt+h#1 + ....+"k yt+h#k    (4) 
 
where ut is assumed to be white noise process. Analogous to the indicator model forecasts, 
the optimal lag length k of the autoregressive term (AR) is chosen with the Schwarz 
criterion.53  
 
Furthermore, we use a rolling window forecasting scheme to obtain different indicator 
forecasts. A forecast based on a rolling scheme relies on a fixed-length window, which is 
shifted every period and the model and its lag length p or k is re-estimated. The estimation 
sample period covers approximately ten years of our whole sample, while the first estimation 
sample ranges from 1991M02 till 2001M12 and the last from 1996M08 till 2007M06. The 
number of observations in the first estimation time period is equal to the size of our window 
length in the rolling window forecasting scheme (119).  
 
Our forecasting period starts at 2002M01 and ends five years later at 2007M07.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52  Note that the estimation sample is shifted every period. We rely on a rolling forecasting scheme with a fixed-
length window. Therefore, in each step, the underlying forecast period will be shifted one period ahead, than 
equation (1) is reestimated and with the new coefficients of the parameter, the future value for y is calculated.  
53  For both cases the maximum lag length is 15, which allows for rich dynamics. 
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Figure 2 displays the individual indicator and autoregressive forecasts based on equation (3) 
and (4) are plotted together with the reference series. 
 
 
   
 
Figure 2: Individual indicator and autoregressive forecasts 
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4.4.2. Simple Evaluation Criteria 
 
To compare the different indicator predictions with each other and with the benchmark AR 
model, we compute for all our forecasts relative mean square errors (MSEs) and relative 
mean absolute errors (MAEs): 
 
! 
MSE =
1
P
yt " yt
f( )
t=1
P
#
2
         (5) 
 
! 
MAE =
1
P
yt " yt
f
t=1
P
#
          (6) 
 
where yt is the realized value,  the predicted value and  
! 
yt " yt
f( ) denotes the 
(absolute) forecast error in period t, while P is the number of out-of-sample observations 
(P=65) in the individual forecast.  
 
Let us denote the relative MSE’s and MAE’s as: 
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where Indicator denotes the indicator based forecast and AR the benchmark autoregressive 
forecast. If !<1 or "<1 the indicator forecast has a superior forecasting performance (smaller 
MSE (MAE)) than the benchmark model and vice versa.  
 
Note that all forecast errors have the same weight in MSE and MAE, henceforth we call 
them in the following unweighted. Accurate forecasts of extreme observations (high growth 
(booms) or high losses (recessions) of economic growth) that are located in the tails of the 
reference series' distribution might be more important for policy makers than observations 
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that are located around the mean, which is in the neighborhood of zero. Therefore, we 
consider weight functions proposed by van Dijk et al. (2003). In particular they are designed 
to put relatively more weight on forecast errors in times of more extreme observations, i.e. in 
booms or recessions.  
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Formally, the weight functions for the left tail (L) (recession periods) and right tail (R) (boom 
periods) are given by 
 
! 
L(y t"yt
f
) = 1" ˆ F (yt )( ) yt " ytf( )         (9) 
! 
R(y t"yt
f
) = ˆ F (yt ) yt " yt
f( ),         (10) 
where  denotes the empirical cumulative density function yt (reference series).  
is the forecast error in period t. Figure 3 depicts the empirical cumulative density function 
of yt. 
                                    
 
                        
                 Figure 3: Empirical Cumulative Density Function  
 
 
In Table 5a we report computed MSE and MAE values of indicator forecasts relative to the 
corresponding values of the benchmark forecast. In contrast, Table 5b shows the 
performance of individual forecasts in both tails (weighted) relative to their performance over 
the full distribution (unweighted).  
 
Note that values smaller than 0.5 indicate a better performance in the particular tail and vice 
versa. If the value is 0.5. the indicator delivers equal forecast performance in booms, 
recessions and over the full sample. The threshold of 0.5 instead of 1 for unweighted loss 
functions is due to the fact that the means of  and  are equal to 0.5. 
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The results displayed in Table 5a show that, with the exception of the ZEW, all indicators 
beat the AR model when comparing the relative MAE’s and MSE’s, which is smaller than 
one. The FAZ indicator delivers the smallest relative MAE. It seems to be best suited in 
predicting booms (high positive growth rates) and recessions (high negative growth rates) 
when analyzing the relative MAE. The OECD indicator leads also to good results and has a 
high predictive power in our forecasting experiment.  
 
When comparing the relative MSE’s of all forecasts, in our observed time period the 
indicator has predicted best in periods of recessions. It delivers the smallest relative MSE’s 
left tail rank. The results reported in Table 5b show that all forecasts are more accurate in the 
right tail implying that all indicators have a higher predictive power (in the sense of a smaller 
MSE’s) in booms than recessions. The EC indicator in particular improves much in the right 
tail compared to its performance over the full distribution with a relative MSE of 0.381. 
 
We conclude that the indicators do much better in forecasting in periods of high economic 
growth (booms) than in forecasting high economic losses (recessions). The weighted relative 
MSE’s in the right tail is for all indicator projections smaller than 0.5, indicating a better 
forecast performance in booms than over the whole sample. At forecasting recessions the EC 
(MAE: 1.045) and ZEW (MAE: 1.007) indicator forecasts are even beaten by the simple 
autoregressive benchmark model, when exploiting the relative MAE’s.  
 
In all, the OECD indicator performs best when forecasting recession (MSE: 0.768), while the 
FAZ indicator delivers the smallest relative MSE (0.734) and MAE (0.839) at forecasting 
booms. Compared to the full distribution, the EC performs much better at forecasting 
booms than recessions. Therefore, policy makers both in the euro area as well as in CEE 
should give these indicators special attention. 
 
4.4.3. Testing Rationality 
 
In this section we apply the rationality test proposed by Mincer and Zarnovitz (1969) and 
Zarnovitz (1985). This test is used to analyze if the forecast is unbiased in the sense that the 
forecast error is uncorrelated with the forecast itself. If there is any correlation, important 
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information has not been incorporated. The rationality test is based on the following test 
regression: 
 
! 
yt+1 =" + # y t+1
f
+ ut+1,          (11) 
 
where we assume that ut+1 is a white noise process. is the realized value of the reference 
series (euro area industrial production) y at time t+1,  while  is the generated forecast of 
the reference series proposed by the different business cycle indicator forecasts.  
 
The null hypothesis can be formulated as  indicating that the realized 
economic growth  can be fully explained by its indicator forecast. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected in favor of the alternative, we conclude that the forecast is not rational. Then, the 
indicator forecast is not fully able to explain  .  
 
Furthermore, the coefficient of determination R2 of the test regression of the rationality test 
provides a direct assessment of the variability in the reference series that is explained by the 
forecasts. Therefore, it is often interpreted as a simple measure of the degree of predictability 
in the reference series, and hence of the potential economic significance of the forecasts. 
 
When applying the Mincer-Zarnovitz (1969) regression to our forecasting errors derived 
from the individual indicator forecasts, we summarize that nearly all forecasts made by 
indicators are rational and that no important information has been lost. On the contrary, the 
null hypothesis has to be rejected for the FAZ and the EC forecasts at a significant level of 
ten percent. Therefore, important information has not been incorporated and the reference 
series could not fully be explained by FAZ and EC forecast. Although the FAZ forecast is 
correlated somewhat with the contemporaneous forecast error, it delivers the highest value 
for R2.(0.655). The ZEW indicator exhibits less predictive power in terms of the coefficient 
of determination than the benchmark (R2=0.517). 
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4.4.4. Testing Superior Predictive Ability 
 
In this work we are faced with several potential leading indicators that we use for forecasting 
purposes of one time series. Orthodox econometric techniques for forecast evaluating focus 
on testing pair-wise equal predictive ability of available forecasts. Beside the fact that multiple 
testing problems may arise, we aim at testing superior predictive ability. In other words, we 
would like to test the hypothesis that there is no indicator-based forecast outperforming the 
benchmark model by taking into account all forecasts simultaneously.  
 
We therefore make use of a recently proposed test by Hansen (2005) which is a modification 
of White’s (2000) seminal work in two respects which are discussed after introducing the test 
formally. 
 
Let  be the loss difference between a benchmark (labeled as 0) and another 
forecast (labeled as k=1,...,l). Note, that we employ  (MSE) or  
(MAE) and that the number of elements in the forecast model set Mc equals l+1. If  
 holds, we conclude that the benchmark is worse performing than the forecast k.  
 
On the contrary, if , then the benchmark is (weakly) superior to all alternative 
forecasting models that are element of Mc In this case the benchmark exhibits superior 
predictive ability. We choose the autoregressive forecast as the benchmark, see section 4. A 
formal expression of the multiple null hypotheses stated above is given by  
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E(X
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) " 0
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In other words, no forecast  is better than the benchmark model in terms of the 
particular loss function. The maximum operator takes into account that the maximal 
expected loss difference is the most relevant. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we conclude 
that there is at least one forecasting model that is superior to the benchmark.  
 
 
Of course the expectation of  is unexpected but can be consistently estimated with the 
sample mean  where k=1,...,l.  
 
White (2000) proposed the following test statistic for the null hypothesis in equation (12): 
 
! 
t =max
k
P
1/ 2
X 
k           (13) 
 
Note that the limiting distribution of t is not unique under the null hypothesis. Therefore the 
stationary bootstrap method of Politis and Romano (1994) is utilized to obtain the 
distribution of t which we label t*. This way of bootstrapping the distribution builds on 
randomly drawing subsamples from independent lengths which are drawn from a geometric 
distribution with mean q. These subsamples are randomly put together to obtain a 
bootstrapped series. This procedure is repeated B times. 
 
There are two main problems with this approach that are commented in Bao et al. (2006). 
First, the choice of the forecasting scheme is not irrelevant. Even if a recursive scheme is  
quite attractive in general at forecasting, the bootstrap method of Politis and Romano (1994) 
requires a special assumption that cannot be reconciled with such a forecasting scheme, see 
Hansen (2005). To be more precise, old observations have a higher probability to be drawn 
than newer ones in a recursive setting which is avoided in a rolling window setting. Second, 
the Reality Check test of White (2000) is conservative and depends heavily on the structure of 
Mc. If this set contains poor forecasts, then White's test is conservative, since it assumes that 
all competing forecasting models are precisely as good as the benchmark. 
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Notes: Reported values are p-values for the multiple null hypothesis that 
the benchmark is not outperformed by any other competing forecast. 
Upper, Consistent and Lower refer to different p-values explained in the 
text. Left Tail and Right Tail correspond to weighted forecast errors, see 
(9) and (10). 
 
 
 
A solution to the last problem can be found in Hansen (2005), where a standardized test 
statistic is proposed. This test statistic is given by 
 
! 
˜ t = max
k
P
1/ 2
X 
k
ˆ " 
kk           (14) 
 
where  is an estimator of the asymptotic standard deviation of . In order to avoid 
White's assumption that makes the test conservative, a different way of bootstrapping the 
distribution of 
! 
˜ t  was proposed, for details see Hansen (2005). 
 
In addition, two inconsistent probability values can be provided in order to obtain a lower 
and an upper bound for the consistent probability value. The upper bound corresponds to 
the probability value of White's Reality Check test that is conservative. The lower bound 
corresponds to the probability value of a liberal test whose null hypothesis assumes that 
models with worse performance than the benchmark are poor models in the limit, see 
Hansen (2005). 
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Table 7 contains the results of the SPA test. When looking at the results for the MSE’s, we 
find that the null hypothesis (not one indicator forecast outperforms the benchmark AR 
model) is rejected for the unweighted, left tail and right tail case for a given significance level 
of ten percent. We observe that the p-values are close together which means that there are no 
relatively poor forecasts in our model set. Or with other words: there is always an indicator 
based forecast, which is able to beat the simple AR benchmark model. Turning to the MAE, 
we have to change our conclusion with respect to the relative performance of the benchmark 
model in periods of recessions: in this case the indicator forecasts are not able to outperform 
the AR benchmark significantly. 
 
4.5. Conclusions  
 
In this paper we investigate the predictive performance of seven leading indicators for the 
euro area. These indicators gain special interest at predicting in periods of extreme economic 
losses (recessions) and high economic growths (booms). Precise predictions of output are 
highly relevant for CEE and EU policy making and European enterprises, as economic policy 
decisions are founded on expectations concerning the business cycle (e.g. government 
spending, household consolidation, wage bargaining process, debt brakes). Using the VAR 
framework we find that all euro area indicators have significantly high in-sample predictive 
ability. After having generated out-of-sample forecasts starting in January 2002 we apply 
several techniques to evaluate their predictive power. We focus on the performance during 
periods of booms and recessions by applying weight functions proposed by van Dijk et al. 
(2003). Our findings suggest that the performance of indicators varies within the business 
cycle, especially between booms and recessions. This result is underlined by an application of 
Hansen's test against superior predictive ability, see Hansen (2005).  
 
Our results of the out-of-sample experiment imply that most indicators are able to beat a 
univariate autoregressive benchmark model in terms of popular loss functions like the MSE. 
Additionally, we find that most indicators perform better and are more reliable in boom-
periods than in times of recessions. CEE and euro area policy makers should therefore pay 
attention, when interpreting those business cycle indicators for their decision making process. 
In all, the OECD and FAZ (both composite indicators, consisting of time series for the EU-
13 and EU-27) deliver the most accurate predictions for the underlying observation period. 
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Moreover, the forecast with the EC indicator, which is based on a dynamic factor model, 
performs best in times of high economic growth (high growth of industrial production). In 
periods of recessions no indicator is able to beat the forecast by the simple autoregressive 
model significantly. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Capital Flows, Wage Determination and Current 
Account Deficits in Central and Eastern 
Europe54 
 
!
5.1. Introduction 
 
Before the recent economic and financial crisis in 2008, the economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) have been characterized by rising current account deficits fostered by 
increasing international capital inflows (see Herrmann and Winkler 2009, Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2006, Eichengreen and Park 2006, Herrmann and Jochem 2005a, b). These high 
and rising current account deficits could be associated with possible overinvestment, 
decreasing competitiveness, economic instability and crisis (Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008). 
 
Wage policy is a key issue regarding European economic policy making (European 
Commission 2009) to maintain countries competitiveness in the integration process. Even if 
the labor market integration between the old and the new member states in the EU-27 has 
been increasing, large differences in wage levels persist (ECOFIN 2005, European 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 This paper was presented at a seminar at the ifo Institute in Munich and a Ph.D. seminar in Leipzig. This 
research was partly carried out during an exchange visit at UC Berkeley, USA. 
 93!
Commission 2007, Eurostat 2010). Thus, labor unions in CEE tend to claim substantial wage 
increases to achieve a faster wage convergence towards the EU15. These claims have been 
accentuated by high labor migration to Western Europe that has led to a shortage of (highly-
qualified) workers (Goretti 2008) in CEE.  
 
Moreover, up to the recent crisis, wage growth in CEE tended to exceed productivity growth, 
which contributed to rising current account deficits in CEE (European Commission 2009): If 
wages increases exceed productivity growth, the respective real (wage-based) appreciation 
deteriorates the current account balance. One reason for the not balanced wage increases 
could partly be seen in increasing capital inflows, in the form of bank credits or foreign direct 
investments (FDI), which were transmitted via the wage bargaining process into higher 
wages. The consequence was more vulnerability to economic crisis and sustained recessions, 
which could be recently observed following the economic and financial crisis (European 
Commission 2010).  
 
To model the relationship between wages and productivity and to derive the respective real 
wage-based exchange rate, an extension of the seminal Lindbeck model (see Schnabl and 
Ziegler (2011), Belke et al. (2009), Lindbeck (1979)) is employed. The Lindbeck model 
describes the wage setting behavior in small open Scandinavian economies during the 
Bretton-Woods period, where productivity and wage increases are assumed to be driven by 
domestic capital formation. The paper extends the model to international capital markets, i.e. 
capital inflows, which can be observed in CEE in the process of (EMU) integration. The 
extended model allows a derivation of the relationship between wage-based real appreciation 
and productivity, which is linked to the current account balance. The model is empirically 
analyzed in a panel data approach. 
 
5.2. Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to analyze the impact of wage determination on the current account balance in 
emerging markets, this paper builds on the Scandinavian model of wage adjustment as 
proposed by Lindbeck (1979). The standard Lindbeck approach can be seen as a dynamic 
version of the Balassa-Samuelson (1964) model and goes back to a group of Norwegian (see 
Aukrust, Holte and Stoltz 1967) and Swedish economists (Edgren, Gösta, Faxén and Odhner 
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1970). The model explains the wage adjustment process in Scandinavia in the economic 
catch-up during the times of the Bretton Woods System. 
 
The model links domestically driven productivity and inflation to the wage setting process in 
small open economies. In contrast to the standard Lindbeck model, where only domestically 
driven productivity influences the wage setting process next to inflation, we extend the model 
with respect to international capital market driven productivity increases analogous to Belke 
et al. (2009).  We link the extended Lindbeck model to the current account balance to 
scrutinize the impact of the wage-based real exchange rate on the current account balance. 
 
5.2.1. The Lindbeck Model 
 
In the traditional Scandinavian model of wage adjustment Lindbeck (1979) links the 
domestically driven wage bargaining process to the (international) goods markets. He 
assumes that the wage bargaining process is initiated in the (industrial) tradable goods sector, 
where labor productivity tends to grow faster than in the non-tradable (service) sector 
! 
("qNT < "qT ) , where 
! 
"qNT  is the productivity growth in the non-tradable goods sector and 
! 
"qT  in the tradable goods sector. The trade unions in the ''unsheltered'' tradable sector are 
assumed to focus their wage bargaining on productivity gains 
! 
("qT ) plus eventual tradable 
goods price increases 
! 
"pT
d . Therefore, the average rate of wage growth in the tradable goods 
sector is given by: 
! 
"wT
d
= "qT
d
+ "pT
d .  
 
As workers are aware of increasing productivity, they bargain fiercely for wage increases. Due 
to ''labor solidarity'' and labor mobility between the manufacturing sector and the non-
tradable sectors the manufacturing wage increases are transmitted to wage increases in the 
service sector
! 
("w
T
d
= "w
NT
d
) . As the non-tradable sectors were widely shielded from world 
markets, prices in these sectors were assumed not to be driven by international competition 
but to be based on domestic labor costs. The inflation in the non-tradable sector 
! 
"pNT
d
 is 
equivalent to wage increases 
! 
"w
NT
d  minus productivity gains in the non-tradable goods sector 
! 
"qNT
d
! 
("pNT
d
= "wNT
d
#"qNT
d  with 
! 
"qNT
d
< "qT
d
). Given perfect arbitrage, domestic inflation in 
the tradable goods sector 
! 
"pT
d  is assumed to be equal to inflation on world traded good 
markets
! 
"pT
W (measured in terms of the dominant international money) plus the rate of 
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currency appreciation/depreciation
! 
"e !
! 
"pT
d = "pT
W + "e( ). The general domestic inflation 
! 
"p
d  
is defined as 
! 
" p
d
=#" pT
d
+ (1$#)" pNT
d
= (" pT
W
+ "e) + (1$#)("qT
d
$"qNT
d
). 
 
The overall domestic wage growth (
! 
"w
d ) is given by the sum of overall productivity growth  
(
! 
"q
d ) and inflation (
! 
" p
d ) (
! 
"w
d
= " p
d
+ "q
d ). Overall productivity growth
! 
"qd = #"qT
d
+ (1$ #)"qNT
d  is assumed to be a composite of traded goods and non-traded 
goods productivity growth given the respective weights
! 
"and 
! 
(1" #).  
 
Lindbeck (1979) assumed that in the long-term trade unions in the traded goods sector of 
countries in the economic catch-up process do not negotiate for wage increases higher than 
productivity increases plus world market inflation to maintain the competitiveness of the 
domestic export industry to prevent rising structural unemployment. Trade unions anticipate 
that if real wages rise above productivity increases, manufacturing goods would become 
uncompetitive in world market with a fall in employment. They therefore do not bet for 
higher wages than 
! 
"(#qT $#qNT ) + #pT
d  in the long-run. Thus, the overall supply driven 
nominal wage growth in CEE is defined as: 
 
! 
"w
d
= # ("qT $"qNT ) + "pT
W
+ "e ,        (1)  
 
where
! 
" =1+ # $%  is a positive constant term.
55 Whereas wage increases beyond equation 
(1) may be possible in the short run, in the long run trade unions would return to equation (1) 
to avoid rising structural unemployment.  
Thus, equation (1) defines the natural (long-run) rate of nominal wage increases in a small 
open economy. According to equation (1) nominal wage growth is driven by labor 
productivity gains of the tradable goods sector relative to the non-tradable goods sector as 
well as by imported inflation in the traded goods sector 
! 
"pT
W( )and exchange rate changes 
! 
"e( ) .  
 
Assuming price notations of the Central and Eastern European currencies a positive 
(negative) 
! 
"e  is equivalent to depreciation (appreciation). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55
 For a detailed derivation of the Lindbeck model see Schnabl and Ziegler (2011). 
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5.2.2. The Lindbeck Model and International Capital Inflows 
 
In this subsection we extend the Lindbeck model by international capital markets. Building 
upon Belke et al. (2009), who introduce capital markets into the standard Balassa-Samuelson 
model, we allow capital inflows to influence the wage setting process.  
 
It is assumed that opening capital markets leads to capital inflows and is therefore equal to 
offering more capital at a substantially lower interest rate.56 Low European Central Bank 
interest rates and a positive economic outlook have led to rising capital inflows into CEE up 
to the crisis in 2008, i.e. bank lendings from euro area banks to CEE grew enormously due to 
substantial interest rate spreads vis-à-vis the euro area (Schnabl and Hoffmann 2008). Those 
capital inflows such as FDI, portfolio investment and bank credit can function as a vehicle of 
technology transfer which allows upgrading domestic production technologies and 
investment in new fields of production (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007).  
 
This leads to higher productivity and improved management know-how compared to a 
setting without access to international capital markets. Overall productivity increases. To 
analyze the impact of the foreign capital driven productivity growth on the wage setting 
process in our model, we split relative productivity increases 
! 
" (#qT $#qNT ) from equation 
(1) into productivity increases driven by domestic capital flows
! 
("qT
d
#"qNT
d
)  and labor 
productivity driven by foreign capital inflow: 
! 
("qT
CI
#"qNT
CI
) : 
! 
" d (#qT
d
$#qNT
d
) + "CI (#qT
CI
$#qNT
CI
) ! with 
! 
" = "
d
+ "
CI
, which models wage increases
! 
"w
CI
d  
under capital market liberalization: 
 
! 
"wCI
d
= # d ("qT
d
$"qNT
d
) + #CI ("qT
CI
$"qNT
CI
) + "pT
W
+ "e      (2) 
 
with and being positive constant terms.57  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56
  Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) describe capital markets in emerging economies as underdeveloped and 
fragmented. This results in a shortage of capital for the domestic economy and may result in a holdup in 
domestic productivity increases. 
57  Please keep in mind, in the standard Lindbeck model would be zero, indicating that international capital 
formation has no impact on the wage setting process.  
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The rate of wage increases in emerging economies with capital market liberalization is higher 
than in an economy with no access to international capital markets 
! 
"w
CI
d
> "w
d , if 
! 
"CI (#qT
CI
$#qNT
CI
) > 0 . Wage setting in emerging economies in small open economies with 
open capital markets is therefore contingent on productivity increases both driven by 
domestic and international capital formation, by tradable goods inflation and by exchange 
rate changes.  
 
However, in emerging market economies with high capital inflows such as in CEE, real 
wages may rise above productivity increases as suggested by Figure 3 and 4. Henry and 
Sasson (2008, 2009) argue that real wages grow faster in developing economics as a 
consequence of capital market liberalization and that capital inflows are partly consumed in 
form of higher wages. Even if the European Commission (2009) strictly recommends all 
CEE economies to restore their competitiveness by aligning wage adjustments closer to 
productivity developments, wage increases are still higher than productivity increases.  
 
Therefore, we relax the assumption that labor unions would not bid for wage increases higher 
than productivity growth and world market inflation and assume that due to high capital 
inflows wages may increase faster than productivity. The outcome would be that wages in the 
country in the economic catch-up process rise above what would be justified by relative 
productivity increases: 
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" ˆ w CI
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> # d ("qT
d
$"qNT
d
) + #CI ("qT
CI
$"qNT
CI
) + "pT
W
+ "e      (3) 
 
Wage increases 
! 
" ˆ w 
CI
d  in catching-up economies rise above domestic driven and capital inflow 
driven productivity increases plus domestic inflation originating in the tradable sector (world 
market inflation plus the rate of depreciation/ appreciation). Transforming equation (3) gives 
us a real wage-based real exchange rate
! 
("e #" ˆ w 
CI
d
) , which depends on productivity increases 
and tradable good inflation: 
 
! 
"(#e "# ˆ w CI
d
) > $ d (#qT
d
"#qNT
d
) + $CI (#qT
CI
"#qNT
CI
) + #pT
W
     (4) 
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The upshot of equation (4) is that wage-based real appreciation in the emerging economy 
! 
"(#e "# ˆ w 
CI
d
) > 0  is not balanced by productivity 
! 
" d #qT
d
$#qNT
d( ) + "CI #qTCI $#qNTCI( )( )   and 
world price increases for traded goods 
! 
"pT
W . The outcome is that – assuming constant prices 
for traded goods in world market 
! 
"pT
W
= 0 –wage-based real appreciation
! 
"(#e "# ˆ w 
CI
d
) > 0 
of 
emerging market currencies goes beyond what is justified by productivity gains 
! 
" d #qT
d
$#qNT
d( ) + "CI #qTCI $#qNTCI( )( )  and therefore deteriorates countries competitiveness.   
 
5.3. The Extended Lindbeck Model and the Current Account 
 
We link the wage-based real exchange rate to the current account balance. In the traditional 
Lindbeck model, which is a dynamic version of the Balassa-Samuelson model (Balassa 1964, 
Samuelson 1964) it is assumed that productivity growth
! 
"(#qT
d
$#qNT
d
) in the economic catch-
up is a gradual process that does not influence the current account position (CA), because 
productivity increases are balanced by wage increases
! 
"w
d , exchange rate changes 58 and 
prices changes on international markets 
! 
"pT
W . Thus productivity increases, exchange rate 
movements, changes in world market tradable good prices and wage growth or alternatively 
wage-based real appreciations drawn from equation (1) have no impact on the current 
account balance (CA) yielding: 
 
! 
CA =" +# ($qT %$qNT ) + &$w
d
+ '$e + $pT
W
. ! ! ! ! ! ! (5)  
 
Or expressing it with the wage-based real exchange rate 
! 
"e #" ˆ w 
CI
d( ) leads to the following 
transformation of (5):59 
 
! 
" CA =# +$(%qT &%qNT ) + '(%e &% ˆ w CI
d
) + %pT
W
! ! ! ! ! (5*)
    
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58  Productivity increases are further assumed to be exogenous and just driven by domestic capital formation. 
59  The equations, which are transformed to analyze directly the impact of the wage-based real exchange rate on the 
current account are marked with a *. 
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! 
"  is as a constant term. Following Lindbeck productivity increases are balanced by wage 
increases and exchange rate changes 
! 
"(#e "# ˆ w CI
d
) = $ d (#qT
d
"#qNT
d
) + $CI (#qT
CI
"#qNT
CI
) + %#pT
W  and have no impact on the current 
account balance.  
 
This assumption may have been valid during the times of the Bretton-Woods system, when 
private international capital inflows were strongly restricted. Current account deficits in that 
time were mainly subject to government financing, and therefore usually not sustainable and 
small. However, in contrast to the Scandinavian economies during Bretton-Woods, CEE was 
characterized up to the financial crisis 2008 by buoyant capital inflows. As discussed, those 
capital inflows may have made wages increase faster than productivity.  
 
Therefore, international and national capital driven productivity increases are not balanced by 
wage increases
! 
"w
d , world tradable good inflation 
! 
"pT
W  and exchange rate changes  or the 
wage-based real exchange rate
! 
"(#e "# ˆ w 
CI
d
)  (see equation (3) and (4)). The consequence is, 
that real wage-based appreciation 
! 
"(#e "# ˆ w 
CI
d
) > 0 , which is fuelled by capital inflows, goes 
beyond what is justified by relative productivity increases and deteriorates the current account 
position: 
 
! 
CA =" +# ($qT %$qNT )
*
+ &$wd + '$e + $pT
W
      (6) 
! 
" CA =# +$(%qT &%qNT )
*
+ '(%e &% ˆ w CI
d
) + %pT
W
     (6*) 
 
with 
! 
("qT #"qNT )
*
= ("qT
d
#"qNT
d
) + ("qT
CI
#"qNT
CI
). This implies that the wage-based real 
currency appreciation60 
! 
("(#e "# ˆ w CI
d
) > 0$ (#e "# ˆ w CI
d
) < 0) partly fuelled by capital inflows 
exceeds productivity increases 
! 
(("qT #"qNT )
*
> 0)  and leads to an increasing current account 
deficit with 
! 
" >> # . 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60  Which can be due to nominal domestic appreciation and/or higher wage growth in compared to the world wage 
growth. 
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In contrast to the wage setting process in the standard Lindbeck model, the wage setting 
process in small open economies with open capital market has an impact on the current 
account position (equation (6*)) via real wage-based appreciation. 
 
Rising current account deficits reflect the inflows of capital in form of FDI’s, bank lending or 
other investments leading to higher wage increases than productivity growth. If therefore a 
real appreciation is derived from an increase in wages (negative impact on the current 
account), which is not completely balanced by increasing productivity (positive impact on the 
current account (smaller than the impact of real wage appreciation)), the competiveness of a 
country in the world market will decrease as we can see in equation (6) and (6*) with 
! 
" >> # .  
 
Domestic products become relatively more expensive and the purchasing power of foreign 
currencies declines in the domestic market. Moreover, if capital inflows suddenly stop for 
instance due to a financial crisis, the CEE countries would – under a fixed exchange rates 
regime – be forced to restore competitiveness by cutting wages. However, if the labor market 
in the respective country is not flexible enough, a sustained recession will be the result.61  
 
5.4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Based on the theoretical findings from the extended Lindbeck model in section three, this 
chapter investigates whether equation (6) and (6*) holds for the CEE countries from an inter-
temporal and cross-section perspective. We analyze eight CEE countries, which entered the 
European Union in May 2004, namely Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), 
Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Slovak Republic (SK), and Slovenia (SI). Bulgaria 
(BG) and Romania (RO), which joined the European Union in January 2007, are omitted due 
to missing (wage) data.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61   This imposes a financial burden on future generations and the risk of inability to service the generated debts rises. 
Following Arize, Olibe and Nam (2003), increasing debt payments restrict consumption and lead to a lower 
living standard in the long-run. For instance, in Greece capital inflows decreased in the financial and economic 
crisis 2008 to 2011, while wages were kept on a high level due to wage rigidities, leading to severe crisis. In 
contrast, Latvia faced decreasing capital inflows as well, but, due to high wage flexibility, wage cuts helped to 
balance Latvia’s competitiveness. As a result Latvia did not face the same economic turbulences as in Greece and 
is likely to recover faster (see Autumn forecast of the European Commission, November 2010). 
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5.4.1. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
Our sample starts in the first quarter of 1995 and ends with the last quarter of 2008. Before 
1995 data on the former transition economies are very fragmented and can therefore not be 
used in our balanced panel. Quarterly data is used, which is the smallest available frequency 
for all considered time series. To adjust data seasonally year-over-year growth rates are 
calculated.  
 
To control for the country size we use the current account balance (CA) in percent of GDP 
as dependent variable
! 
CA
GDP
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' , which is taken from the IMF. With the exception of Estonia62, 
nominal wage indices 
! 
w
d
are drawn and calculated from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics.  
 
World tradable goods prices 
! 
pT
W  are proxied by German export prices as export prices for the 
euro area as the main trading partner of the CEE economies are not available and Germany 
is the largest country in the euro area and for most CEE the main trade partner. The 
quarterly averages of exchange rates 
! 
"e in price notation against the euro (before 1999: 
Deutsche Mark) are taken from Eurostat. The real wage-based exchange rates 
! 
("e #" ˆ w 
CI
d
)are 
calculated from nominal exchange rates between CEE and the euro area and with the CEE/ 
euro area wage differential. 63 
! 
("e #" ˆ w 
CI
d
) < 0 (("e #" ˆ w 
CI
d
) > 0) indicates a real wage-based 
currency appreciation (depreciation). 
 
As relative productivity measure 
! 
("qT #"qNT )
*we take the gross value added per person 
employed for the industry and manufacturing sector (here: tradable goods sector) in relation 
to the building and construction and service sector (here: non-tradable goods sector) in real 
terms.64 As another proxy, we make use of the ratio of consumer (CPI) to producer prices 
(PPI) in CEE analogous to De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) and Schnabl and Ziegler (2011) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62  Estonian wage indices are calculated from nominal gross wages provided by the national statistic. 
63  Due to data unavailability we use German wage data as proxy for the euro area. 
64  This proxy can be only used for the graphical analysis, because it is only available on a annual data basis. 
 102!
(data source: IMF IFS statistics). As additional productivity proxy real GDP per capita 
growth is used in the econometric exercise.65  
 
Before conducting the empirical analysis in a panel data approach, we provide a descriptive 
analysis of the underlying variables. Figure 1 displays the development of the current account 
in CEE in percent of its GDP (CA). Nearly all economies face a constant current account 
deficit with a mean below zero. Until the recent crisis starting in 2008 the current account 
deficits of the Baltic states, which peg their exchange rate to the euro (
! 
"e = 0 ), were roughly 
around 20 percent of GDP. During the recent crisis, the current account deficits have shrunk 
due to declining capital inflows, wage cuts and shrinking imports. 
 
Figure 1: Current account in percent of GDP, 1995–2008 
 
Source: IMF. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65  Please note, that wages are indirectly included in GDP per capita. Therefore, the results may therefore be biased. 
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Figure 2 shows the (seasonal adjusted) real wage index of CEE economies with 2005 as basis 
year.66 Wages in the Baltics increased strongly in comparison to the other CEE economies. 
However, the Estonian and Latvian government as well as their private sectors have started 
to cut wages (see Bloomberg 2010) since the financial and economic crisis (see Bloomberg 
2010). While wages in Latvia increased enormously in times of the boom, in the recent crisis 
wages especially in the public sector were cut to a high extent. However, those wage cuts are 
only partly visible in the data, which end in 2008. Please note, that even if wages grow rapidly 
in all CEE countries, wage levels in CEE differ. In addition, wages and salaries in CEE are in 
general much lower than in Western Europe (FedEE 2010). 
 
Figure 2: Real wage indices, 2005Q1=100, 1995–2008 
 
Source: IMF, authors calculations.!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66
 Note, that in the econometric estimations wage indices are seasonally adjusted by calculating year-aver-year growth 
rates of the real wage index. In Figure 2 data is adjusted with the Census X-12 procedure. 
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!
To show relative productivity growth differential (domestic and international capital driven) 
! 
("qT #"qNT )
* , we use the real gross value added per person employed for the industry and 
manufacturing sector (here: tradable goods sector) in relation to the building and 
construction and service sector (here: non-tradable goods sector)67. Annual growth rates of 
this variable (continuous line) are displayed together with annual real wage growth (dotted 
line) (see Figure 3) illustrating that for nearly all CEE economies annual wage growth is 
clearly exceeding productivity growth during the observation period. 
 
Figure 3: Annual growth rates of real wages and of real gross value added per person 
employed (in the tradable minus non-tradable good sector), 1997–2008 
 
       Source: AMECO data, European Commission, authors calculation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 We cannot include this productivity measure in our econometric analysis due to the annual frequency of this data. 
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Figure 4 shows as alternative productivity measure 
! 
("qT #"qNT )
* consumer prices  (CPI) in 
relation to producer prices (PPI) in CEE. Following Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), 
this measure regards relative price increases of non-traded goods versus traded goods as a 
proxy for relative productivity gains. They argue if prices in the non-tradable good sector 
(CPI) exceed prices in the tradable good sector (PPI), this would indicate a rising productivity 
in the emerging economy. Figure 4 shows clearly that wage (dotted line) exceed productivity 
increases (continuous line), particularly in the last decade. The graphical analysis of this figure 
supports the conclusions drawn from Figure 3: Wage growth in CEE has tended to exceed 
productivity growth. 
 
 
Figure 4: Real wage and productivity development (CPI/ PPI), 1995Q1=100, 1995-
2008 
 
               Source: IMF, authors calculations 
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The nominal exchange rates are displayed in Figure 5. In CEE different exchange rate 
systems exist. A group of countries, namely Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary and 
Poland allowed their exchange rate to float to a high degree, while the other group, the Baltic 
countries, Slovakia and Slovenia, exhibit low exchange rate volatility against the euro. The 
Estonian currency board was pegging the kroon tightly to the euro (or DM) in the whole 
observation period and has introduced the euro in 2011. Lithuania and Latvia pegged their 
currencies to the dollar and a currency basket before pegging them to the euro. The monetary 
authorities of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have implemented inflation targeting 
frameworks and let their exchange rates float (more or less) freely. They have continued to 
postpone the euro adoption targets. 
 
 
Figure 5: Nominal exchange rates to the euro (before 1999: Deutsche Mark), 1995–
2008 
 
          Source: Eurostat. 
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2.1 Reference Series
Our reference series is given by the year-over-year (yoy) growth rate of industrial pro-
duction index for the Euro Area (source: Datastream), which is available at a monthly
frequency. Alternatively, we may have used the quarterly recorded GDP but this would
imply a much smaller sample size. It is a well known fact that estimators perform better
and inference gets more reliable as the sample size increases. Therefore, we employ the
industrial production series as reference. Although this production-index counts only one
third of the total GDP most impulses leading the business cycle are caused by the indus-
trial sector (see ?). In addition, we choose to have a balanced sample size across indicators,
implying that the data spans from 1991M02 to 2007M07.
2.2 The Business-Cycle- Indicators
We consider in our study seven different business cycle indicators for the Euro Area. These
indicators are constructed from different newspaper, banks or economic research centers
3
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Figure 6 displays the wage-based real exchange rate 
! 
("e #" ˆ w CI
d
)  against the euro area wage 
increases derived from equation (6). For all economies a strong wage-based real appreciation 
is visible (decreasing line) in the catching-up process.  
 
 
Figure 6: Wage-based real exchange rates68, 1995–2008 
 
        Source: IMF, Eurostat, authors calculation 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68  For the calculation of the real wage-based exchange rate next to nominal exchange rate the CEE/ euro area wage   
    differential with 1995 Q1=100 is used. 
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5.4.2. Estimation Framework 
 
Motivated by the descriptive analysis, we estimate equation (6) and (6*) for a CEE cross-
country panel to identify the impact of wage growth, productivity growth, world inflation of 
tradable goods and exchange rate changes and accordingly of the real wage-based exchange 
on the current account balance: 
 
! 
CA
GDP
" 
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
it
= µ +( ()qT *)qNT )it
*
+ +)wit
d + ,)eit +-)pt
W + .it
   (7) 
! 
"
CA
GDP
# 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
( 
it
= µ +) (*qT +*qNT )it
*
+ ,(*e +* ˆ w CI
d
)it + -*pt
W + .it    (7*) 
 
where i=1,..,8 denotes the cross-section and t=1996 Q1,…,2008Q4 the time dimension. 
! 
µ 
is a constant term. 
 
To test, if variables included in our regression are subject to possible instatitionarity, the 
Fisher-ADF panel unit root test (Choi 2001, Madalla and Wu (1999)) is applied. This test is 
based on individual p-values for the unit root hypothesis, which are combined in a second 
step to obtain an overall p-value. It does not find evidence for unit roots in the investigated 
panel. Henceforth, neither panel cointegration nor spurious regressions are a matter of 
concern.  
 
To specify the panel data model properties it is tested for random effects against fixed 
effects. The Hausman-test (Hausman 1978) rejects in all estimation approaches the null 
hypothesis of random effects in favor of a fixed effects specification.  
 
To address for possible endogeneity in the data (f.e. current account vs. capital inflows), an 
instrumental variable estimator (IV) is implemented based on a two-stage least squares 
estimator with White period standard errors (White 1980, Arellano 1987). Up to four lags of 
the endogenous variable as well as of the exogenous variables are used as instruments. The 
null hypothesis of validity of instruments with Sargan-Test (Sargan 1958) cannot be rejected 
for all specifications (see Table 1 till 8).  
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To analyze the impact of international capital driven wage and productivity growth, we
 
employ interaction terms controlling for the influence of capital inflows 
! 
IN
GDP
on wages and 
on productivity69:
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The effect of rising wages (equation (8) or real wage-based changes (equation (8*)) induced 
by capital inflows is measured by the sum of the coefficients
! 
" + "*  or 
! 
" + "* respectively. 
The effect of capital induced productivity changes on the current account regarding is 
measured by 
! 
" +"* . 
 
To control for a potential mean-shift due to the economic crisis 2008/2009 and for the 
Russian crisis hurting the Baltics and the Czech economies in 1997/98, we estimate the 
baseline regressions furthermore with a crisis dummy:   
 
! 
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(9*)
 
 
! 
with crisis =
0, otherwise
1, for t = 2008 or for CZ,EE,LT,LV if t =1997,1998" 
# 
$ 
 
 
Alternatively, we estimate equation (7) and (7*) with a shorter panel not including the recent 
financial crisis, which ends 2007. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69
 
The inflows are proxied by cumulated net FDI’s, portfolio and other investments in relation to countries GDP. 
Data is drawn from the IMF International
 
Financial Statistics. 
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Furthermore, equation (7) and (7*) are estimated with a standard panel estimation approach 
with corrected standard errors (White 1980). This is due to the fact, that even if the empirical 
results of the Sargan test suggest that the instruments are valid, one may argue that the 
estimation results can be biased due to the choice of instruments.  
 
5.4.3. Results 
 
The estimation results are shown in Table 1 till Table 8. Table 1 reports the regressions, 
where relative changes of consumer versus producer prices are used as a proxy for relative 
productivity changes as productivity measure (CPI/PPI). Table 2 shows the results with GDP 
per capita growth as alternative productivity measure (GDP). Table 3 (CPI/PPI) and 4 (GDP) 
display the estimation results with the crisis dummy (equation 9 and 9*). Table 5 (CPI/PPI) 
and 6 (GDP) refer to a shorter panel estimation, while Table 7 (CPI/PPI) and 8 (GDP) report 
the results from a simple OLS estimation approach.  
 
In each of the table we apply four different estimations. We present the estimations of 
equation (7) in column 1. The results of the estimated equation (7*) reported in column 2. 
Column 3 and 4 present the results of the estimated equations (8) and (8*) with interaction 
terms. 
 
In equation (7) all estimated parameters have the expected sign (Table 1). The productivity 
measure and the wage term are significant at the common levels. Higher productivity leads to 
a lower current account deficit. A higher wage growth lets the current account deficit 
increase. The coefficient measuring the impact of wage growth on the current account is in 
all estimation frameworks significant on the 1% level. A wage growth of ten percent let the 
current account deficit increase by roughly two percent. The nominal exchange rate and 
world tradable good inflation does not affect the current account balance directly; its 
coefficient is not statistically significant from zero.  
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Table 1: Results, CPI/PPI productivity measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Sargan (H0: no overidentification) show 
the p-value of the respective tests. 
 
 
Variable 
(1) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(2) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(3) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(4) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.050*** 0.004 -0.061*** 0.004 -0.056*** 0.014 -0.056*** 0.014 
Wage -0.261*** 0.064 - - 0.247** 0.113 - - 
Wage*Capital 
inflows  - - - - -3.648*** 0.933 - - 
Exchange rate -0.005 0.032 - - -0.056 0.041 - - 
Real wage ex - - 0.108** 0.045 - - -0.285** 0.127 
World inflation -0.122 0.222 0.064 0.240 0.055 0.197 0.196 0.208 
Real wage ex* 
Capital inflows - - - - - - 3.707*** 1.389 
Productivity 0.203*** 0.064 0.127* 0.072 0.121 0.208 0.108 0.198 
Productivity* 
Capital inflows - - - - 0.246 1.723 -0.138 1.767 
Capital inflows - - - - -0.060 0.171 -0.081 0.126 
R-squared adj. 0.476  0.413  0.470  0.325  
Sargan 0.10  0.22  0.05  0.04  
obs 384  384  384  384  
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Table 2: Results, GDP per capita growth as productivity measure 
!
Variable 
(1) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(2) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(3) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(4) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.048*** 0.005 -0.062*** 0.004 -0.073*** 0.021 -0.064*** 0.016 
Wage -0.222*** 0.072 - - 0.282** 0.130 - - 
Wage*Capital 
inflows - - - - -4.110*** 1.234 - - 
Exchange rate -0.037 0.052 - - -0.029 0.075 - - 
World inflation -0107 0.229 0.071 0.232 0.109 0.206   
Real wage ex - - 0.133* 0.072 - - -0.321* 0.161 
Real wage ex* 
Capital inflows - - - - - - 3.898** 1.668 
Productivity -0.032 0.064 0.049 0.081 0.153 0.145 0.061 0.135 
Productivity* 
Capital inflows - - - - -0.934 1.280 -0.795 1.153 
Capital inflows - - - - 0.146 0.224 0.061 0.135 
R-squared adj. 0.456  0.400  0.443  0.288  
Sargan 0.07  0.21  0.04  0.02  
obs 384  384  384  384  
 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Sargan (H0: no overidentification) show 
the p-value of the respective tests. 
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Table 3: Results, CPI/PPI Crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Sargan (H0: no overidentification) show 
the p-value of the respective tests. 
Variable 
(1) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(2) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(3) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(4) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.050*** 0.004 -0.059*** 0.004 -0.053*** 0.013 -0.058*** 0.014 
Wage -0.255*** 0.061 - - 0.229** 0.118 - - 
Wage*Capital 
inflows - - - - -3.361*** 0.909 - - 
Exchange rate -0.012 0.034 - - -0.062 0.040 - - 
World inflation -0.038 0.231 0.194 0.235 0.132 0.197 0.315 0.206 
Real wage ex - - 0.141*** 0.046 - - -0.318** 0.123 
Real wage ex* 
Capital inflows - - - - - - 3.934*** 1.356 
Productivity 0.223*** 0.062 0.157** 0.072 0.159 0.195 0.173 0.197 
Productivity* 
Capital inflows - - - - 0.101 1.594 -0.462 1.745 
Capital inflows - - - - -0.097 0.167 -0.058 0.177 
Crisis -0.018*** 0.005 -0.015*** 0.072 -0.021*** 0.004 -0.023 0.004 
R-squared adj. 0.485  0.416  0.478  0.318  
Sargan 0.07  0.29  0.09  0.10  
obs 384  384  384  384  
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The results of the estimated equation (7*) signalize, that the parameter measuring the impact 
of the wage-based real exchange rate on the current account balance is highly significant at 
the 1 or 5 percent significance level. A ten percent real appreciation therefore leads 
approximately to a one percent rising current account deficit. In contrast to the results from 
the estimated equation (7), productivity growth has no significant impact on the current 
account deficit.  
 
We estimate equation (8) and (8*) to measure the direct influence from capital inflows on 
wage growth and productivity with interaction terms. The results show that both variables 
controlling for wage increases, namely wage growth (column 3) and real wage-based exchange 
rate (column 4) lead to an increasing current account deficit. The coefficients of those 
interaction terms are highly significant, while the estimated coefficients for the productivity 
terms are insignificant.  
 
Table 2 reports the result with GDP per capita growth as alternative productivity measure. 
The results are widely robust and support the conclusions drawn from Table 1. Increasing 
wages, affect the current account negatively. Nominal exchange rate movements as well as 
world tradable goods inflation have no significant impact on the current account, while a 
wage-based real appreciation against the euro area leads to an increasing deficit. The effect of 
relative productivity growth on the current account balance is -in contrast to the previous 
regressions- positive, but insignificant.  
 
For the estimation framework with interaction terms, both the wage and the wage interaction 
term coefficients have a significant impact on the current account. We conclude that wage 
growth fuelled by capital inflows increases the current account deficit. 
 
Table 3 and 4 display the estimation set-ups with a crisis dummy. The results are qualitatively 
the same. Increasing wages and decreasing productivity (not significant for the estimation 
approach with GDP per capita growth as productivity proxy) boost the current account 
deficit. A real wage appreciation leads to an increasing current account deficit. The nominal 
exchange rate and price changes in world tradable goods have no significant impact. In all 
estimation approaches the crisis dummy has an additional negative impact on the countries 
competiveness, indicating that a high current account deficit is seen as an indicator for a crisis 
(see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009).  
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Table 4: Results, GDP per capita growth as productivity measure, crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Sargan (H0: no overidentification) show 
the p-value of the respective tests. 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
(1) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(2) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(3) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(4) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.047*** 0.005 -0.061*** 0.004 -0.070*** 0.019 -0.065*** 0.016 
Wage -0.229*** 0.072 - - 0.258** 0.132 - - 
Wage*Capital 
inflows - - - - -3.709*** 1.271 - - 
Exchange rate -0.051 0.049 - - -0.038 0.089 - - 
World inflation -0.101 0.229 0.132 0.237 0.013 0.178 0.344 0.216 
Real wage ex - - 0.134* 0.072 - - -0.363** 0.163 
Real wage ex* 
Capital inflows - - - - - - 4.282** 1.659 
Productivity -0.029 0.072 0.062 0.080 0.192 0.198 0.037 0.136 
Productivity* 
Capital inflows - - - - -1.174 1.516 -0.485 1.499 
Capital inflows - - - - 0.079 0.217 0.036 0.195 
Crisis -0.013** 0.005 -0.013** 0.006 -0.019 0.005 -0.022*** 0.005 
R-squared adj. 0.461  0.402  0.451  0.286  
Sargan 0.10  0.06  0.07  0.05  
obs 384  384  384  384  
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Table 5: Results, CPI/PPI productivity measure, short panel 
 
Variable 
(1) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(2) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(3) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(4) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.050*** 0.004 -0.061*** 0.004 -0.053*** 0.013 -0.059*** 0.014 
Wage -0.251*** 0.062 - - 0.258** 0.113 - - 
Wage*Capital 
inflows - - - - -3.506*** 0.930 - - 
Exchange rate -0.022 0.034 - - -0.073* 0.042 - - 
World inflation -0.043 0.227 0.098 0.241 0.128 0.198 0.319 0.211 
Real wage ex - - 0.093** 0.046 - - -0.323** 0.131 
Real wage ex* 
Capital inflows - - - - - - 3.936*** 1.428 
Productivity 0.213*** 0.071 0.118 0.074 0.064 0.206 0.168 0.202 
Productivity* 
Capital inflows - - - - 0.735 1.616 -0.598 1.784 
Capital inflows - - - - -0.098 0.162 -0.048 0.173 
R-squared adj. 0.479  0.413  0.464  0.307  
Sargan 0.76  0.607  0.15  0.12  
obs 352  352  352  352  
!
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Sargan (H0: no overidentification) show 
the p-value of the respective tests. 
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Table 6: Results, GDP per capita growth as productivity measure, short panel 
 
Variable 
(1) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(2) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(3) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(4) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.048*** 0.006 -0.063*** 0.005 -0.077*** 0.021 -0.064*** 0.016 
Wage -0.227*** 0.075 - - 0.242* 0.142 - - 
Wage*Capital 
inflows - - - - -3.472*** 1.268 - - 
Exchange rate -0.029 0.057 - - -0.005 0.128 - - 
World inflation -0.077 0.234 0.061 0.234 -0.255 0.918   
Real wage ex - - 0.163** 0.080 - - -0.368* 0.187 
Real wage ex* 
Capital inflows - - - - - - 4.229** 1.680 
Productivity -0.010 0.071 0.116 0.088 0.380 0.237 0.044 0.146 
Productivity* 
Capital inflows - - - - -2.328 1.695 -0.511 1.543 
Capital inflows - - - - 0.113 0.230 0.017 0.199 
R-squared adj. 0.459  0.492  0.348  0.259  
Sargan 0.672  0.507  0.10  0.09  
obs 352  352  352  352  
 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Sargan (H0: no overidentification) show 
the p-value of the respective tests. 
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Table 7: Results, CPI/PPI productivity measure, OLS 
 
Variable 
(1) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(2) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(3) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(4) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.052*** 0.004 -0.062*** 0.004 -0.052*** 0.005 -0.050*** 0.004 
Wage -0.177*** 0.053 - - 0.054 0.064 - - 
Wage*Capital 
inflows - - - - -1.918*** 0.500 - - 
Exchange rate 0.001 0.030 - - -0.035 0.029 - - 
World inflation -0.302 0.228 -0.153 0.240 -0.185 0.191   
Real wage ex - - 0.065* 0.040 - - -0.036 0.038 
Real wage ex* 
Capital inflows - - - - - - 0.967** 0.05 
Productivity 0.188*** 0.063 0.134** 0.064 0.075 0.102 0.078 0.092 
Productivity* 
Capital inflows - - - - 0.662 0.726 0.227 0.768 
Capital inflows - - - - -0.043 0.058 -0.141** 0.056 
R-squared adj. 0.427  0.413  0.552  0.505  
Sargan -  -  -  -  
obs 416  416  416  416  
!
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Sargan (H0: no overidentification) show 
the p-value of the respective tests. 
!
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Table 8: Results, GDP per capita growth as productivity measure, OLS 
!
Variable 
(1) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(2) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(3) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
(4) 
 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -0.051*** 0.004 -0.059*** 0.004 -0.051*** 0.005 -0.049*** 0.004 
Wage -0.152*** 0.055 - - 0.073 0.058 - - 
Wage*Capital 
inflows - - - - -1.837*** 0.540- - - 
Exchange rate -0.017 0.033 - - -0.061** 0.027 - - 
World inflation -0.345 0.224 -0.159 0.235 -0.212 0.183   
Real wage ex - - 0.054* 0.048 - - -0.045 0.045 
Real wage ex* 
Capital inflows - - - - - - 0.937** 0.485 
Productivity -0.003 0.033 -0.016 0.031 -0.003 0.037 -0.058 0.043 
Productivity* 
Capital inflows - - - - -0.187 0.4228 -0.172 0.549 
Capital inflows - - - - -0.039 0.061 -0.130** 0.053 
R-squared adj. 0.413  0.374  0.540  0.500  
Sargan -  -  -  -  
obs 416  416  416  416  
 
Notes: White period standard errors. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below estimates. ***/**/* 
indicates that values are significantly different from 0 at the 1/5/10 percent level.  denotes the adjusted 
coefficient of determination. obs shows the total number of observations. Sargan (H0: no overidentification) show 
the p-value of the respective tests. 
!
!
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The results for a shorter sample size, ending before the financial and economic crisis are 
robust (Table 5 and 6). However, in Table 6, where GDP per capita growth is taken as 
productivity measure, productivity growth has in mostly a positive and significant impact on 
the current account balance. The other results are widely unchanged. Higher wage growth or 
wage-based real appreciation against the euro let the current account deficit rise and have a 
negative impact on competitiveness. 
 
The results of the standard Panel OLS estimation approach with corrected standard errors 
(White 1980) are displayed in Table 7 and 8. The results are in line with the conclusion drawn 
from the IV/GMM regressions: Real wage-based exchange rate appreciation boosts the 
current account deficit, if it cannot be balanced by productivity increases. 
 
All in all, the results based on our extended Lindbeck framework explaining current account 
deficits provide evidence that an over-proportional wage growth increases the current 
account imbalance. In our empirical set-up we find a high and significant negative 
relationship between wage growth and the current account balance: Wage increases, which 
are not balanced by productivity increases lead to a rising current account deficit. And a rising 
current account deficit is one determinant of signalizing competitiveness losses (European 
Commission 2010). 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
 
We analyze the role of the wages exceeding productivity growth and its influence on the 
current account balance in Central and Eastern Europe by extending the traditional Lindbeck 
model (1979) and investigate it empirically. Panel IV estimations reveal a negative and robust 
relationship between CEE wage growth and its current account deficits. A real wage-based 
current account appreciation, which can be especially observed in countries pegging their 
exchange rate to the euro, leads to an increasing current account deficit.  
 
We find that rising capital inflows are an important determinant for the CEE wage 
determination process. Thus, capital inflows, which are not only used for (profit-making) 
investments leading to future earnings, but for a higher consumption in form of higher 
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wages, which are not balanced by productivity growth, CEE countries face a loss of 
competitiveness via wage-based real appreciation deteriorating the current account balance. 
This impact may cover especially those capital inflows, which are translated directly into 
wages and are not backed by respective productivity gains.  
 
With the financial and economic crisis, the consequence of a sudden stop of high capital 
inflows has received broad attention, for instance the economic downturn in Latvia. 
However, due to Latvia’s very flexible labor market, Latvia seems to recover quickly and will 
restore its competitiveness fast. Other CEE affected from the crisis used the nominal 
depreciation path to reanimate their competitiveness. However, next to Slovenia, the Slovak 
Republic and Estonia who entered the EMU in 2007, 2009 and 2011 all other CEE 
economies are required to join the monetary union (EMU) upon entering the EU. Therefore, 
this depreciation path cannot be used after entering the monetary union.  
 
The paper points out the necessity of a balance between wage and productivity growth. It 
claims that in countries, especially with fixed exchange rate systems, wages should be flexible 
to balance competitiveness via wage-based real depreciation. This behavior can be recently 
observed in the Baltic’s, which allow for substantial wage cuts to maintain the 
competitiveness. Therefore, labor market flexibility is a good instrument to participate in 
times of booms due to higher wages and helps in times of recessions to stabilize the economy 
and to maintain competitiveness.  
 
  122 
5.6. References 
 
Aukrust, O., F. Holte, G. Stoltz (1967): Instilling II fra Utredningsutvalget for 
Inntektsoppgjörene 1966, Oslo. 
Arellano, M. (1987). Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within-Groups Estimators, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 49, 431–434. 
Arellano, M., O. Bover (1995): Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable Estimation of 
Error-Components Models. Journal of Econometrics 68, 29–51. 
Arize, A. C., Olibe, K. and K. Nam (2003): Are Current Account Deficits Sustainable? A 
statistical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 15 (1), 2508–2535. 
Balassa, B. (1964): The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal. Journal of Political 
Economy 6, 584–566.  
Belke, A., G. Schnabl, H. Zemanek (2009): Real Convergence, Capital Flows, and 
Competitiveness in Central and Eastern Europe, CESifo Working Paper 2835. 
Bini-Smaghi, Lorenzo (2007): Real Convergence in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe, Speech at the ECB Conference on Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe. 
Bloomberg (2010): Latvia Regained Competitiveness on Wage Cuts, S&P’s Gill Says. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en&sid=a3hAd91OCGUs 
Choi, I. (2001): Unit Root Tests for Panel Data, Journal of International Money and Finance 20, 
249–272. 
De Grauwe, P., G. Schnabl (2005): Nominal versus Real Convergence with Respect to EMU 
Accession – EMU Entry Scenarios for the New Member States. Kyklos 58, 481–499.  
Deutsche Bundesbank (2006): Determinanten der Leistungsbilanzentwicklung in den mittel-
und osteuropäischen EU Mitgliedsländern und die Rolle deutscher Direktinvestionen. 
Deutsche Bundesbank Monatsbericht Januar 2006, 17–36. 
ECOFIN (2005): The Employment Guidelines (2005–2008).  
Edgren, G., K.-O.Faxén , C.-E. Odhner, 1970, Lönbebildning och Samhällsekonomi (Wage 
Formation and the Economy, in Swedish), Rabén & Sjögren, Stockholm. 
  123 
Eichengreen, B. and R. Hausmann (1999): Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility. NBER 
Working Paper 7418. 
Eichengreen, B. and Y. C. Park (2006): Global Imbalances and Emerging Markets, in J.J. 
Teunissen and A. Akkerman (eds.), Global Imbalances and the US Debt Problem: 
Should Developing Countries Support the US Dollar?, FONDAD. 
European Commission (2007): Ten Years of the European Employment Strategy (EES).  
European Commission (2009): Implementation of the Lisbon Strategy Structural Reforms in 
the context of the European Economic Recovery Plan - Annual country assessments: 
Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the 2009 up-date of 
the broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and the 
Community and on the implementation of Member States' employment policies. 
European Commission (2010): Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, 
growths and jobs- Tools for stronger EU economic governance, Commission 
document 367/2.  
Eurostat (2010): Living conditions in 2008 17% of EU27 population at risk of poverty higher 
risk of poverty among children and elderly, Stat 10/10. 
FedEE (2010): The Federation of European Employers: Competitive wage costs. 
http://www.fedee.com/payinasia.shtml  
Goretti, M. (2008): Wage-Price Setting in New EU Member States, IMF Workings Paper 243. 
Handelsblatt (2009): Lettland: Musterland ist abgebrannt, 16.06.2009. 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/lettland-musterland-ist-
abgebrannt;2362131 
Hausman, J. A. (1978): Specification Tests in Econometrics, Econometrica 49, 1377-1398. 
Henry, P.B., D. Sasson (2009): Capital Market Integration and Wages. NBER Working Paper 
15204. 
Henry, P.B., D. Sasson (2008): Capital Account Liberalization, Real Wages, and Productivity. 
NBER Working Paper 13880. 
Herrmann, S., A. Jochem (2005a): Determinants of Current Account Developments in the 
Central and Eastern EU Member States- Consequences for the Enlargement of the 
Euro Area. Bundesbank Discussion Paper 32. 
  124 
Herrmann, S., A. Jochem (2005b): Trade balances of the central and east European EU 
member states and the role of foreign direct investment. Bundesbank Discussion 
Paper 41. 
Herrmann, S., A. Winkler (2009): Financial markets and the current account: emerging 
Europe versus emerging Asia, Review of World Economics 145, 531–550.  
Herrmann, Sabine (2009): "Do we really know that flexible exchange rates facilitate current 
account adjustment? Some new empirical evidence for CEE countries," Bundesbank 
Discussion Paper 22. 
Lane, P. R. Lane, G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (2007): Europe and global imbalances, Economic Policy, 
22, 519-573. 
Lindbeck, A. (1979): Inflation and Unemployment in Open Economies, Amsterdam, North Holland. 
Maddala, G.S., S. Wu (1999): A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data and a 
New Simple Test, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 61, 631–652. 
Reinhart, C.M, K.S. Rogoff (2009): This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial 
Folly, Princeton University Press. 
Samuelson, P. (1964): Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems. Review of Economics and Statistics 
64, 145–154.  
Sargan, J. D. (1958): The Estimation of Economic Relationships Using Instrumental 
Variables, Econometrica 26, 393–341. 
Schnabl, G., A. Hoffmann (2008): Monetary Policy, Vagabonding Liquidity and Bursting 
Bubbles in New and Emerging Markets – An Overinvestment View. The World 
Economy 31, 1226–1252. 
Schnabl, G., C. Ziegler (2011): Exchange Rate Regime and Wage Determination in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Journal of Policy Modeling, 3, 347-360 
White, H. (1980): Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 
Test for Heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817–883 
  125 
Selbstständigkeitserklärung  
  
Hiermit erkläre ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbstständig und ohne unzulässige fremde 
Hilfe angefertigt zu haben. Ich habe keine anderen als die angeführten Quellen und 
Hilfsmittel benutzt und sämtliche Textstellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus 
veröffentlichten oder unveröffentlichten Schriften entnommen wurden, und alle Angaben, 
die auf mündlichen Auskünften beruhen, als solche kenntlich gemacht. Ebenfalls sind alle 
von anderen Personen bereitgestellten Materialien oder erbrachten Dienstleistungen als 
solche gekennzeichnet.  
  
  
  
 Christina Ziegler 
 Berlin, 20. Juni 2011 
........................................................................................  
 (Ort, Datum) (Unterschrift)  
  
  
 
  126 
Bibliographische Beschreibung 
 
Ziegler, Christina Elisabeth 
Exchange Rate Stability and Wage Determination in Central and Eastern Europe 
Universität Leipzig, Dissertation  
120 S.*, 119 Lit.*, 40 Abb., 2 Anlagen 
 
Referat:  
In Folge der Osterweiterung der europäischen Union (EU) und der steigenden 
Arbeitsmarktintegration zwischen den EU15 und den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten ist die 
Lohnfindung  in Mittel- und Osteuropa zu einem Schwerpunkt der europäischer 
Wirtschaftspolitik geworden. Zugleich wird das optimale Wechselkursregime für mittel- und 
osteuropäische Staaten kontrovers diskutiert. Die Dissertation befasst sich mit der 
Fragestellung, welche Wechselkursstrategie in Mittel- und Osteuropa vorzuziehen ist, um 
zum einen den Lohnfindungsprozess zu optimieren und zum anderen den 
Anpassungsprozess (Konvergenzprozess) an europäische Lohnstandards zu beschleunigen. 
Diese kumulierte Arbeit besteht aus vier unabhängigen Fachaufsätzen. Zuerst wird der Frage 
nachgegangen, welche Wechselkursstrategie einen optimalen Rahmen für die Lohnsetzung 
während des Aufholprozesses mittel- und osteuropäischer Staaten ermöglicht (Kapitel zwei). 
Im Kapitel drei wird die Rolle der Geldpolitik in Bezug auf die Lohnfindung in Staaten mit 
flexiblen Wechselkursen untersucht. Die Evaluierung der Prognosefähigkeit alternativer 
Konjunkturindikatoren für die Euro Zone sowie deren Implikationen für den 
Lohnverhandlungsprozess in Mittel-und Osteuropa ist Gegenstand der Analyse in Kapitel 
vier. Im fünften Kapitel wird der Rolle der Lohnpolitik auf Leistungsbilanz(un)gleichgewichte 
in Mittel- und Osteuropa nachgegangen. 
